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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0").
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The issues presented on appeal are as follows:
1.

Whether the district court erred by granting Appellee Mona Vincent
Lunceford's ("Mona") Motion to Dismiss, brought pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6).

Dismissals under Rule 12(b)(6) are proper "only where it clearly appears that the
plaintiff or plaintiffs would not be entitled to any relief under the facts alleged or under any
state of facts they could prove to support their claim." See Franco v. The Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-Dav Saints. 2001 UT 25, flO, 21 P.3d 198. This Court affirms a district
court's dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) "only if it is apparent that as a matter of law, the
plaintiff could not recover under the facts alleged." Id. The standard of review is therefore
de novo, because appellate courts "consider only the legal sufficiency of the complaint,"
granting "the trial court's ruling no deference." Id. This issue was preserved in the trial court
by motion. See R. at 068 (motion); id. at 109-24 (Plaintiffs' opposition memorandum); id.
at 125-67 (reply memorandum); id. at 182-91 (ruling); kL at 257-60 (order).
2.

Whether the district court erred in refusing to reconsider its ruling granting
Mona's Motion to Dismiss.

The standard of review for this issue is abuse of discretion. See In re General
Determination, 1999 UT 39,^22,982 P.2d 65. This issue was also preserved in the trial court
by motion. See R. at 268 (motion); id. at 349-78 (opposition memorandum); id. at 382-96
(reply memorandum); id. at 397-99 (ruling); KL at 428-31 (order).
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3.

Whether the district court erred by awarding Mona any attorneys' fees at all
incurred in connection with her Motion to Dismiss.

The standard of review for the threshold issue of entitlement to any amount of
attorneys' fees is also de novo, because the award of attorneys' fees is dependent upon the
district court's underlying ruling on the Rule 12(b)(6) motion. On the other hand, issues
related to the amount of attorneys' fees awarded (as opposed to issues related to entitlement
to attorneys' fees in the first place) are reviewed for abuse of discretion, both for the district
court's determination as to the identity of the prevailing party, see R.T. Nielson Co. v. Cook,
2002 UT 11, f25, 40 P.3d 1119, as well as for the district court's determination as to the
amount of the fees awarded, see Bakowski v. Mountain States Steel Inc., 2002 UT 62, ^[33,
52 P.3d 1179. These issues were preserved in the trial court by way of opposition to the Rule
12(b)(6) motion, see supra, and by written objection, see R. at 265.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES
Interpretation of the following rule is of central importance to this appeal:
Rule 12(b)(6): . . . [T]he following defenses may at the option of the pleader
be made by motion: . . . (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. . . . If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for
failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the
motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as
provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to
present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In 1999, Clyde M. Lunceford ("Clyde"), who was the father of Appellants Scott A.
Lunceford ("Scott") and Deborah Lunceford Harker ("Deborah," "Debra," or "Debbie")
(collectively, "Appellants") and the husband of Appellee Mona Vincent Lunceford ("Mona"),
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set up a trust known as the Clyde M. Lunceford Trust ("the Trust"). See R. at 084, 284. In
or around July 2000, Clyde executed documents restating the Trust in its entirety. In both sets
of documents, Clyde installed himself as the Trustee of the Trust. Id. at 010-23, 284.
The assets of the Trust were (1) a parcel of property in Utah County, Utah ("the Utah
County Property"), and (2) a condominium unit in Coronado, California ("the California
Condominium"). Id. at 084,284. After the 2000 restatement, the beneficiaries of the Trust
were Clyde's wife (Mona) and Clyde's children from a previous marriage (Appellants). As
set forth in the Trust documents after the 2000 restatement, Mona was to be conveyed a life
estate in the California Condominium by the Trustee after the death of Clyde, and Appellants
were to receive equal shares of all remaining assets of the Trust. Id. at 20-21, 284.
The Trust was a revocable trust, id. at 021, and therefore Clyde, as Trustee, had the
right to amend the Trust in any way at any time, including the right to remove Appellants as
beneficiaries. Indeed, in June 2001 Clyde had a meeting with his personal attorney, M. Dayle
Jeffs ("Jeffs"), wherein Clyde discussed with Jeffs certain problems he had been having with
his children (Appellants). In that meeting, Clyde told Jeffs that he had been seriously
considering amending his Trust to give the residual estate to his grandchildren rather than to
Appellants. However, Clyde did not ask Jeffs to assist him in making any such amendment,
and Clyde did not act to amend the Trust at that time. Id. at 283.
In August 2001, Clyde had another meeting with Jeffs wherein Clyde again told Jeffs
that he was considering leaving the residual estate in the Utah County property and the
California Condominium to his grandchildren rather than to Appellants. He told Jeffs during
this meeting that he still hadn't decided whether to effect this amendment or not, and that he
680078v1
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would decide later whether to so amend the Trust. Id.
On August 20,2001, Clyde did amend the Trust, but did not change the beneficiaries.
The sole amendment effected on August 20, 2001 was to install Jeffs as the new Trustee of
the Trust, replacing Clyde. Id- at 005, 283. From that point forward, until October 2003,
Jeffs served as Trustee of the Trust. Id. at 283.
During the latter part of 2001, Clyde told Jeffs more about the many disputes he had
with Appellants and some of the family business entities, some of which disputes had become
quite heated, and Clyde mentioned to Jeffs that he was considering whether to sue Scott and
Scott's wife Becky. The main dispute was about a limited liability company that had been
created to hold Lunceford family assets—Clyde felt like he did not have sufficient control
over the assets, which had originally been contributed by Clyde to the LLC, and the children
contended that Clyde's capital account in the LLC was overdrawn. There were several other
ancillary disputes, including one concerning the California Condominium and the Utah
County Property, in which Appellants claimed that they, rather than the Trust, enjoyed
immediate fee simple ownership of the Condominium and the Property (as opposed to merely
having some revocable future interest through the Trust). Id. at 283.
During this time period, Clyde and some of the other members of the family entered
into negotiations to attempt to resolve these intra-family disputes before they ripened into
litigation. The product of those negotiations was a Settlement Agreement and Mutual
Release ("the Settlement Agreement"), which was executed effective January 22,2002. Id.
at 075-85 (copy attached hereto as Exhibit A). In his capacity as Trustee and on behalf of
Clyde, Jeffs was actively involved in these negotiations, and drafted an initial settlement
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instrument that was signed in 2001, which was thereafter expanded upon and signed by other
persons besides Clyde and Scott in the more formal document dated January 22, 2002. Id.
at 282. Both Mona and Appellants also participated in the negotiation and drafting of the
Settlement Agreement.
There were ten (10) parties to the Settlement Agreement, including many of the
Lunceford family business entities, and including Appellants, Jeffs, and Mona. In the
"Recitals" section of the Settlement Agreement, the parties recited that Appellants and Mona
were still the only beneficiaries of the Trust:
Clyde established the [Trust] as its settlor on or about December 3, 1999. By
amendment to Trust dated July 21, 200[0], Clyde executed an agreement
restating the Trust in its entirety. By Second Amendment to the Trust dated
August 20, 2001, Clyde removed himself and Scott as the co-trustees of the
Trust and appointed the Trustee [Jeffs] as the trustee of the Trust. As of the
date ofexecution ofthis Agreement, the Trustee continues to serve as trustee
of the Trust and the Trust beneficiaries are as stated in the Trust, as
amended.
Id. at 084 (Recital D) (emphasis added). Also in the "Recitals" section, the parties described
the disputes that they had recently been having, as follows:
[c]ertain disputes arose between the parties to this agreement, and although
litigation was threatened, litigation has not been commenced. These disputes
include, but are not limited to, the following:
1)

Claims by Clyde that [Appellants] mismanaged the [family] LLC
.. .,
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2)

Claims by Clyde that [Appellants and one of their companies]
improperly obtained loans from the LLC or otherwise
improperly used the cash or assets of the LLC for purposes not
related to the LLC;

3)

Claims by Clyde that he is entitled to a monthly income from the
LLC . . . ;
-5-

4)

Claims by [Appellants] that Clyde interfered with the operations
of the LLC and LP, [and] overdrew his capital account in the
LLC . . . ;

5)

Claims by [Appellants] that Mona exercised improper and undue
influence over Clyde to their prejudice as the natural heirs of
Clyde and otherwise improperly interfered with family business
affairs;

6)

Claims by Clyde that [Appellants] improperly denied to him
access to records and other information concerning the LLC's
operations and affairs;

7)

Claims by [Appellants and one of their companies] that Clyde
and his agents defamed or disparaged them and their businesses;

8)

Claims by [Appellants] against Clyde and Mona of entitlement
to present or immediate testamentary interests in the Coronado
Condominium and the [Utah County Property].

Id. at 083-84 (emphasis added). These eight grievances were referred to as the "Claims"
throughout the Settlement Agreement, and were settled and released in connection with the
Settlement Agreement. Seekl. at081 (paragraph 9 contains a "General Reciprocal Release").
However, in an effort to avoid confusion on the point, the parties agreed to further language
in the Settlement Agreement regarding Appellants' rights vis-a-vis the Trust. In Paragraphs
4 and 5, the parties agreed as follows:
4.
Release of Claims to Condominium and Residence. Scott,
Becky, Debra and Richard [Appellants and their spouses], individually and
collectively, release any claim, rights or title in and to the [Utah County
Property] and the Coronado Condominium. Clyde, and the Trustee,
acknowledge delivery by Scott and Becky of a quit claim deed to the Coronado
Condominium transferring to the Trustee, for the Trust, any right, title or
interest of Scott and Becky in the record title to the Coronado Condominium.
5.
No Restriction on Right of Disposition. This Agreement shall
not, in any manner, restrict, impair, or limit Clyde's right or ability to
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distribute any of his property by lifetime transfer, will or other testamentary
disposition, or in any other manner, to any person or persons of his choosing.
Id. at 082 (italics added).
Jeffs (on behalf of Clyde) and Appellants came to a meeting of the minds regarding
the meaning of these provisions. Both Jeffs and Appellants understood that Paragraph 4
meant that Appellants and their spouses were waiving any claim that they were, at that time,
entitled to present use of and/or fee simple title to the California Condominium and the Utah
County Property, and that Appellants, as part of the Settlement Agreement, would convey to
the Trust via quit-claim deed any interest they might have to present fee simple ownership
of the condominium. However, both Jeffs and Appellants understood that Paragraph 4 did
not curtail any rights Appellants might have under the Trust, and neither Jeffs nor Appellants
understood that Clyde intended to, or did, amend the Trust in any way through Paragraph 4
or any other provision of the Settlement Agreement. Id. at 282.
Indeed, Jeffs and Appellants thought Paragraph 5 of the Settlement Agreement made
clear that the Trust remained unaffected by Appellants' release of their claim to immediate
fee simple title to the California Condominium and the Utah County Property. Paragraph 5
states that nothing in the Settlement Agreement shall impair Clyde's future rights to amend
his will, the Trust, or any other testamentary instrument. Both Jeffs and Appellants
understood, and still understand, this language to mean that the Settlement Agreement did not
in any way impair Clyde's right to leave the California Condominium and/or the Utah County
Property, upon his death, to whomever he might select (including Appellants), through his
will, through the Trust, or through other testamentary means. Id. at 281-82. Indeed, during
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the time of negotiation of the Settlement Agreement, Clyde and Jeffs specifically discussed
that if the property were placed back in the Trust, Clyde could do with it as he later decided
without any restriction, including leaving an interest to Appellants. Id. at 281.
Jeffs is certain that Clyde shared the same understanding of the Settlement Agreement
now espoused by Jeffs and Appellants. Indeed, in February 2002, only weeks after the
execution of the Settlement Agreement, Clyde came to Jeffs' office for a meeting. During
that meeting, the two men continued the conversation they had been having in various
meetings about Clyde's testamentary intentions for the California Condominium and the Utah
County Property, and Jeffs asked Clyde if he had decided whether to make his grandchildren
(rather than Appellants) the beneficiaries of his Trust. Clyde told Jeffs that he still hadn't
decided whether to amend the Trust to remove Appellants as beneficiaries and substitute the
grandchildren. Id.
During all of these conversations between Clyde and Jeffs in 2001 and 2002 about
whether to substitute the grandchildren for the children as Trust beneficiaries, there was never
any discussion about amending the Trust to leave Mona additional assets of the Trust (other
than the life estate in the California Condominium which she would receive upon Clyde's
death under the Trust language as written). Id.
During the spring and summer of 2002, Clyde suffered a series of health problems,
and was eventually moved to East Lake Care Center in Provo so that he could get full-time
medical and other care. In July 2002, Jeffs met with Clyde at East Lake, and was
disheartened by Clyde's deteriorating condition. Clyde could not really carry on a coherent
conversation, and could not adequately respond to inquiries about whether to sell the
680078vl
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California Condominium. After this July meeting, Jeffs concluded that Clyde appeared to
lack capacity to address issues related to the Trust. Id.
In October 2002, Mona telephoned Jeffs, and told him that she needed to have some
changes made so that she would be able to manage his affairs given Clyde's deteriorating
condition. Then she had Clyde get on the phone. When he got on the phone, he told Jeffs
that he wanted a power of attorney for Mona. Jeffs asked him what that was for, and he said
"So she can sign the checks." Jeffs informed him that it was Jeffs5 understanding that Mona
was already a signatory on the bank account and was paying all of his bills. He then called
to Mona in a loud voice, "Mona what am I supposed to tell Dayle?" Jeffs could hear Mona
tell Clyde to tell Jeffs that she, Mona, needed to be Trustee. Clyde then told Jeffs that he
wanted Mona to be the Trustee. Since Jeffs was already of the opinion that Clyde lacked
capacity to make those kinds of decisions about the Trust, Jeffs declined to act on Mona's
instructions. Id. at 280.
In November 2002, Jeffs had a meeting with Mona to discuss several issues related
to Clyde's affairs. Mona again told Jeffs that she needed to be made Trustee of the Trust, and
that Clyde had expressed to her that he wanted Mona to have the California Condominium
and the Utah County Property (in other words, all of the Trust assets). At that meeting, Jeffs
asked her how Clyde was doing and she said "Sometimes he seems to be rational and other
times not rational." This conversation reinforced Jeffs' belief that Clyde lacked capacity to
make changes in the Trust. Id.
On December 20, 2002, Jeffs learned that Mona had hired the law firm of Kirton &
McConkie to represent her interests related to her claim that Clyde had intended that Mona
680078v 1
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have all of the Trust assets. Over the next few weeks and months, Jeffs spoke on the
telephone with and corresponded with Mona's attorneys in this regard. Id.
During this period of time, Mona reported to Jeffs that Clyde's condition was
worsening, and he was requiring an increasing amount of money to pay for his care. In his
capacity as Trustee, Jeffs concluded that it had become necessary to sell the Utah County
Property in order to generate funds to maintain Clyde in his deteriorated health condition.
On January 17, 2003, Jeffs sent a letter to Appellants' counsel and informed him of this
development, and stated that Jeffs was informing counsel of this in view of the fact that he
was "attorney for Scott and Debbie, the residuary beneficiaries under the Trust so that they
might be informed of the necessity of the sale." This comported with Jeffs' understanding
that Appellants remained the residual beneficiaries under the Trust, and that neither the
Settlement Agreement nor any other document had altered this fact in any way. Id. at 279.
In late February 2003, Clyde passed away. Id. at 036, 279.
On or about March 4,2003, Jeffs received a letter from Mona's attorneys. The letter
had three attachments, all dated 2001 ("the three 2001 documents"). Appellants had never
seen the documents before, and Jeffs had no recollection of ever having seen or heard of any
of them before. Each of them was a writing, purportedly from Clyde, indicating that he
intended Mona to receive the Trust assets in full. However, the documents aroused Jeffs'
suspicions for several reasons. First, and most significantly, Jeffs had had numerous
conversations with Clyde, during 2001 and 2002, regarding Clyde's desires for the Trust
assets, and in each of these conversations Clyde had been fully aware of, and in apparent
agreement with, Appellants being residual beneficiaries under the Trust, and, while he had
680078v 1
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agonized for some time about whether to amend the Trust to install his grandchildren (in
place of his children) as residual beneficiaries, he had never once mentioned to Jeffs any
desire to leave these assets to Mona. Id. at 279. Second, the documents themselves appeared
suspicious—one was written in handwriting that was not Clyde's, but was purportedly signed
by Clyde; one was not signed by Clyde at all; and the third was apparently part of an
improper document in which Clyde and Mona had unsuccessfully attempted to transfer the
California Condominium out of the Trust without Scott's knowledge. Id. at 278-79.
On March 10, 2003, Jeffs sent a letter to Mona's attorneys expressing some of these
sentiments, and making clear to Mona's counsel that his understanding of Clyde's intent was
that the California Condominium and the Utah County Property were to remain in the Trust
and that Clyde never once mentioned to Jeffs that he intended for Mona to have either the
California Condominium or the Utah County Property "out right." Id. at 278; see also id. at
273-74 (copy of letter attached as Exhibit B).
On March 20,2003, Jeffs had a telephone conversation with one of Mona's attorneys.
In that conversation, Mona's counsel reiterated Mona's position that she was entitled to the
Trust assets in full, and suggested to Jeffs that, in view of the conflict regarding the Trust
assets, he should resign as Trustee. It appeared to Jeffs as though counsel was assuming that
Mona would replace Jeffs as Trustee of the Trust, and that Mona would, as Trustee, take the
position that the three 2001 documents had amended the Trust in her favor. Id. at 278.
After counsel's suggestion, Jeffs began to consider resigning as Trustee, although he
was reluctant to do so because he recognized the possibility that Mona might, if she became
successor Trustee, have a conflict of interest and not act in an impartial manner. Id.
680078v I
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On May 16,2003, Jeffs sent a letter to Appellants5 counsel in an effort to explain his
view of the situation. Jeffs told Appellants' counsel that, despite Mona's claims and despite
the Settlement Agreement, Jeffs still viewed Appellants as "residuary beneficiaries" under
the Trust to whom "the condo is to be distributed" following Mona's death. Jeffs also
informed counsel of the existence of the three 2001 documents, and told counsel something
of his suspicion regarding the authenticity of those documents. Id.; see also id. at 269-71
(copy of letter attached as Exhibit C).
On October 13, 2003, Jeffs officially resigned as Trustee. Id. at 277.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On October 14,2003, in an effort to prevent Mona from wrongfully appointing herself
Trustee and disposing of Trust assets, Appellants filed a Petition to Construe Rights Under
a Trust and Complaint for Damages, Injunctive Relief, Declaratory Relief and Related Relief
("Petition"). Id at 026-39. In that Petition, Appellants alleged as follows:
•

that Appellants and Mona are "the beneficiaries under" the Trust, id. at 038;

•

that Clyde created the Trust "to hold in trust certain property for the benefit of
Clyde, and after his death, to the benefit of Mona, Scott and Debbie," id. at
037;

•

that upon Clyde's death the Trust's assets were to be distributed to Appellants,
other than the conveyance of a life estate in the California Condominium to
Mona, id. at 036-37;

•

that the Trust was formally amended twice, but only to change trustees, and
that there was no change in the beneficiary provisions or the dispositive
provisions before Clyde's death, id. at 034-36; and

•

that Mona's assertions that Clyde had amended the Trust in 2001 were false,
and that the three 2001 documents were fraudulent, id. at 034.

In the Petition, Appellants sought, inter alia, an order removing Mona as Trustee, damages
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for breaches of fiduciary duty, and declaratory judgment that Plaintiffs are entitled to the
California Condominium following Mona's life estate and the residual interest in the Orem,
Utah property. Id. at 026-28.
Mona submitted an Answer and Counterclaim. Id. at 043-56. Therein, Mona asserted,
in part, that Appellants, by virtue of the Settlement Agreement, had waived their right to sue
for the relief they sought. Id. at 046-48. A few weeks later, in March 2004, Mona moved,
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), to dismiss the Petition on the grounds that Appellants' present
claims were waived in the Settlement Agreement. WL at 075-108. Appellants opposed that
motion, arguing that the Settlement Agreement was intended to waive claims they had
concerning their "present and immediate testamentary interests" in the California
Condominium, but was not intended to waive Appellants' future interests based upon their
then-revocable status as trust beneficiaries. Id. at 109-24.
The district court heard oral argument on the motion on June 22, 2004. Both sides
appeared through counsel, and, in addition, the court noted that Jeffs was present in the
courtroom "in the back sort of on his own." See id. at 484 p.3. During argument, as they had
during briefing, both sides argued that the Settlement Agreement unambiguously supported
their respective positions—Mona argued that the Settlement Agreement's release language
demonstrated unambiguously that Appellants had waived any claim to the California
Condominium and/or the Utah County Property, and Appellants argued that paragraph 5 of
the Settlement Agreement, among other provisions, demonstrated unambiguously that
Appellants were still remainder beneficiaries under the Trust, that the Trust was unaffected
by the Settlement Agreement, and that the only claim regarding the California Condominium
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or the Utah County Property waived by Appellants was their claim to immediate fee simple
possession of it. At one point, Mona's counsel noted that the parties' respective positions
with respect to the meaning of the Settlement Agreement were "equally plausible." See id.
at 484 p.49.
During his argument, counsel for Appellants expressly noted the presence of Mr. Jeffs
in the courtroom, and stated that Jeffs was able to provide testimony bolstering Appellants'
interpretation of the Settlement Agreement, and that Jeffs had written letters to counsel for
both sides setting forth his viewpoints. Id. at 484, p.37. At this point, Mona's counsel
objected, stating that this was a 12(b)(6) motion and arguing that the court should limit its
review to the pleadings. Id. The court sustained the objection. Id. A few minutes later,
Appellants' counsel again urged the court to hear Jeffs' testimony about what the parties
intended, id. at 484, p.40-41, but the court did not allow any such testimony.
After the hearing the court took the matter under advisement, and issued a ruling about
a week later. Id. at 182-91 (copy attached hereto as Exhibit D). In its ruling, the court
reviewed the Settlement Agreement and, despite the parties' conflicting (and apparently
tenable) interpretations of the document, went ahead and interpreted the document on a Rule
12(b)(6) motion, concluding that the Settlement Agreement "was meant to settle all claims
between the parties," and that "[u]nder these circumstances, Plaintiffs cannot prove a set of
facts in support of their claims to invalidate the Settlement Agreement." Id. at 183. Based
on this reasoning, the court granted Mona's motion to dismiss, and issued a written order
several weeks later, officially granting the motion and stating that the Settlement Agreement
unambiguously settled "aU claims between the parties" (emphasis in original). Id. at 259
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(copy attached hereto as Exhibit E).
Appellants were quite surprised by the court's ruling, especially in the context of a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion, and after the ruling contacted Jeffs, who agreed to give an affidavit
setting forth his recollection of events (the "Jeffs Affidavit," copy attached hereto as Exhibit
F). In that Affidavit, Jeffs made clear that his understanding at the time of execution was that
the document was intended to have Plaintiffs affirm "that they did not have any claim that
they were, at that time, entitled to present use and/or fee simple title to the California
Condominium." Jeffs stated that, "I did not understand that [Plaintiffs were] giving up any
rights they might have under the Trust." Id. at 276-85.
In August 2004, Appellants filed a motion asking the district court to reconsider its
ruling on the 12(b)(6) motion in light of the Jeffs Affidavit, which raised multiple issues of
fact regarding the interpretation of the Settlement Agreement and which clearly supported
Appellants' interpretation of that document. Id. at 287-98, 382-96. Appellants pointed out
that the Jeffs Affidavit, at a minimum, makes Appellants' interpretation of the Settlement
Agreement tenable, and therefore means that the Settlement Agreement is ambiguous and
therefore not subject to interpretation in the context of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Id.
The district court denied the Motion to Reconsider in a brief written ruling, reiterating
its earlier ruling that "the Settlement Agreement was meant to settle all claims between the
parties" and that "Plaintiffs cannot prove a set of facts in support of their claims to invalidate
the Settlement Agreement, which is plain on its face." Id. at 398 (emphasis added) (copy
attached hereto as Exhibit G); see also id- at 430 (order, copy attached hereto as Exhibit H).
Finally, the district court also entered an award of attorneys' fees in favor of Mona and
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against Appellants in the amount of $21,244.00, and costs in the amount of $382.19, based
on its earlier ruling that Mona was the prevailing party in litigation over the Settlement
Agreement. See id. at 183, 259, 398, 430, 470-71. The district court's final order was
executed on December 20, 2004, see id. at 469-73 (copy attached hereto as Exhibit I), and
Appellants filed this appeal on January 5, 2005.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The district court made two fundamental errors in this case. First, the district court
refused to consider evidence proffered by Appellants that was relevant to the intentions of
the parties at the time they entered into the Settlement Agreement. The entire objective of
contract interpretation is to attempt to ascertain the intentions of the parties, and the Utah
Supreme Court has instructed that district courts, even when making the threshold
determination whether a contract is ambiguous or not, must consider "any relevant evidence"
regarding the parties' intentions. A district court's refusal to consider proffered relevant
evidence, even at the ambiguity stage, is reversible error.
Second, the district court erred by making the ultimate determination that the
Settlement Agreement is unambiguous and can be unambiguously construed in the manner
espoused by Mona. When the entire contract is examined, along with the proffered relevant
extrinsic evidence regarding the parties' intentions (including the Jeffs Affidavit), it becomes
clear that, at a minimum, the interpretation espoused by Appellants is tenable and reasonable.
In fact, the Jeffs Affidavit, coupled with Appellants' allegations in their Petition, lead
inescapably to the conclusion that Clyde and Appellants had, at the time they entered into the
Settlement Agreement, come to a meeting of the minds regarding the effect of the document,
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and that neither Clyde nor Appellants intended that the Settlement Agreement amend the
Trust or impair Clyde's right to bequeath property through the Trust to any person he wished,
including Appellants. Despite Mona's creative arguments to the contrary, the only claim to
the California Condominium or the Utah County Property that Appellants intended to (or did)
waive was a claim to present and immediate possession of the property; they did not intend
to (and did not) waive any claim to receive the property through the Trust. Remarkably, the
district court ignored the interpretation of the Settlement Agreement espoused by Clyde's
counsel (Jeffs) and Appellants' counsel, who were the primary drafters of the instrument.
For these reasons, the district court erroneously granted Mona' s Rule 12(b)(6) motion.
That decision should be reversed, and this case should be remanded to the district court for
further proceedings, including discovery and, if necessary, trial.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This case comes to this Court on appeal from a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. This Court has
stated that, "when determining whether a trial court properly dismissed an action under rule
12(b)(6), we assume that the factual allegations in the complaint are true and we draw all
reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." See Sony Elecs., Inc. v.
Reber, 2004 UT App 420, 1J10, 103 P.3d 186. Trial courts may not make credibility
determinations in the context of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See Whipple v. American Fork Irr.
Co., 910 P.2d 1218,1220 (Utah 1996) (stating that "the purpose of a rule 12(b)(6) motion is
to challenge the formal sufficiency of the claim for relief, not to establish the facts or resolve
the merits of a case"). A trial court's ruling dismissing a case under Rule 12(b)(6) "should
be affirmed only if it clearly appears [that] the complainant can prove no set of facts in
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support of his or her claims." See Mackev v. Cannon. 2000 UT App 36, TJ9,996 P.2d 1081.
This Court has emphasized that "[a] dismissal is a severe measure and should be granted by
the trial court only if it is clear that a party is not entitled to relief under any state of facts
which could be proved in support of its claim." Id.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT THE
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT CAN BE UNAMBIGUOUSLY CONSTRUED
AGAINST APPELLANTS
The district court's fundamental error in this case was, first, making the threshold

determination that the Settlement Agreement is unambiguous without even considering
relevant proffered evidence regarding the parties' intentions at the time of contracting, and,
second, then proceeding to interpret that Agreement against Appellants as a matter of law in
the context of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Because both parties espouse differing yet apparently
tenable1 interpretations of the Settlement Agreement's provisions, that Agreement is by
definition ambiguous, and the district court's decision to ignore Appellants' interpretation of
the Agreement, especially where that interpretation was supported by Appellants' allegations
in the Petition and by the Jeffs Affidavit, was erroneous and must be reversed.
A.

Basic Rules of Contractual Interpretation

Courts are often asked to interpret contracts, and as a result Utah's appellate courts

1

By "apparently tenable," Appellants refer to the fact that the district court appears to
have concluded that Mona's interpretation was the better one, and therefore at least tenable.
However, Appellants do not concede that Mona's interpretation actually is tenable; to the
contrary, Appellants continue to maintain that Mona's interpretation is patently untenable and
contrary to both the language of the Settlement Agreement itself as well as the available
relevant evidence regarding the parties' intentions at the time of contracting.
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have handed down careful rules for trial courts to follow when interpreting written
instruments. The number one rule of contract interpretation is that, "[i]n interpreting a
contract, the intentions of the parties are controlling." See Central Fla. Invs., Inc. v. Parkwest
Assocs., 2002 UT 3,^12,40 P.3d 599: see also Novell Inc. v. The Canopy Group, Inc., 2004
UT App 162, f20,92 P.3d 768 (same). The whole idea is for courts to interpret contractual
provisions in the manner intended by the parties at the time of contracting.
Thefirstplace courts are instructed to look in determining the parties' intentions is the
language of the contract itself. See Central Fla. Invs.. 2002 UT 3, f 12, 40 P.3d 599 (stating
that "we first look to the four comers of the agreement to determine the intentions of the
parties"). Examination of the contract means examination of the entire contract, not just
examination of one or two isolated provisions; indeed, when examining the contract, courts
are instructed that "[e]ach contract provision is to be considered in relation to all of the
others, with a view toward giving effect to all and ignoring none." See Plateau Min. Co. v.
Utah Div. of State Lands. 802 P.2d 720, 725 (Utah 1990).
But while a court's search for the parties' intentions must begin with an examination
of the four corners of the contract, the court's search may not end there—not even on a Rule
12(b)(6) review, and not even if the court initially feels that the contractual language is plain
and unambiguous. The Utah Supreme Court has made clear that, even at the threshold stage
when attempting to determine whether the contract is ambiguous or not, a court must look
at "any credible evidence offered to show the parties' intention." See Ward v. Intermountain
Farmers Ass'n. 907 P.2d 264,268 (Utah 1995). The Utah Supreme Court has forbidden the
opposite approach, stating as follows:
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When determining whether a contract is ambiguous, any relevant evidence
must be considered. Otherwise, the determination of ambiguity is inherently
one-sided, namely, it is based solely on the 'extrinsic evidence of the judge's
own linguistic education and experience.' Although the terms of an instrument
may seem clear to a particular reader—including a judge—this does not rule
out the possibility that the parties chose the language of the agreement to
express a different meaning. A judge should therefore consider any credible
evidence offered to show the parties9 intention.
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see also Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas
Dravage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641, 644 (Cal. 1968) (cited in Ward) (stating that "a rule
that would limit the determination of the meaning of a written instrument to its four-corners
merely because it seems to the court to be clear and unambiguous, would either deny the
relevance of the intention of the parties or presuppose a degree of verbal precision and
stability our language has not attained"). One leading commentator, cited with approval in
Ward, stated the issue as follows:
On reading the words of a contract, a judge may jump to the instant and
confident opinion that these words have but one reasonable meaning. A
greater familiarity with dictionaries and the usages of words, a better
understanding of the uncertainties of languages, and a comparative study of
more cases in the field of interpretation, will make one beware of holding such
an opinion. A judge who believes that contract terms can have a single,
reasonable meaning that is apparent without reference to extrinsic evidence of
the parties' intentions 'retires into that lawyer's Paradise where all words have
a fixed, precisely ascertained meaning; where [people] may express their
purposes, not only with accuracy, but with fulness; and where, if the writer has
been careful, a lawyer . . . may sit in a chair, inspect the text, and answer all
questions....' Such a belief is unrealistic, for 'the fatal necessity of looking
outside the text in order to identify persons and things, tends steadily to destroy
such illusions and to reveal the essential imperfection of language, whether
spoken or written.'
5 Corbin on Contracts § 24.7, at 32-33 (1998) (citations omitted). In Ward, the Utah
Supreme Court went on to reject older case law espousing a different view of the matter,
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stating that "the better-reasoned approach is to consider the writing in light of the surrounding
circumstances," and concluded its discussion by declaring that
rational interpretation requires at least a preliminary consideration of all
credible evidence offered to prove the intention of the parties . . . so that the
court can 'place itself in the same situation in which the parties found
themselves at the time of contracting.'
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The Utah Supreme Court has more recently
reaffirmed the principles set forth in Ward, see Peterson v. Sunrider Corp., 2002 UT 43, \\9,
48 P.3d 918 (citing Ward, and stating that "[i]n determining whether a contract is ambiguous
the court is not bound to consider only the language of the contract" and that "any relevant
evidence must be considered"); Nielsen v. Gold's Gvm. 2004 UT 37, %7,78 P.3d 600 (citing
Ward and Peterson), and this Court has recently spoken at length on the subject as well,
adopting and applying the principles set forth in Ward, see Gillmor v. Macey. 2005 UT App
351,1f35 & n.14; Novell 2004 UT App 162, ^21, 92 P.3d 768.
If, after reviewing the entire contract and any other evidence relevant to the parties'
intentions at the time of contracting, the court determines that the language of the contract
is and remains unambiguous, that is the end of the court's search—"the parties' intentions
must be determined solely from the language of the contract," see Ward. 907 P.2d at 268, and
"a court may interpret [the contract] as a matter of law," see Dixon v. Pro Image, Inc.. 1999
UT 89, |14, 987 P.2d 48. However, if the language of the contract appears ambiguous after
review of the contract and any relevant evidence, a court must look to extrinsic evidence to
determine the intentions of the parties, see Ward, 907 P.2d at 268, and may not interpret the
contract as a matter of law, see Plateau Min. Co.. 802 P.2d at 725 ("When ambiguity does
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exist, the intent of the parties is a question of fact to be determined by the jury.").
Thus, this threshold evaluation regarding ambiguity—which is a question of law for
the court, see Plateau Min. Co., 802 P.2d at 725 (stating that "[wjhether a contract is
ambiguous is a question of law")—becomes vitally important. It is possible, under certain
circumstances,2 for unambiguous contracts to be construed and interpreted on a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion; ambiguous contracts, by contrast, can never be construed on Rule 12(b)(6) review.
Under Utah law, a contract is ambiguous if the two parties both espouse different
interpretations of the document, and both of those interpretations are, upon examination of
the entire contract and other evidence related to the circumstances at the time of drafting,
reasonable and tenable. See, e^g,, Peterson, 2002 UT 43,1J19,48 P.3d 918 (stating that "[a]
contract provision is ambiguous if it is capable of more than one reasonable interpretation")
Ward. 907 P.2d at 269 (same); Novell. 2004 UT App 162, ^24,92 P.3d 768 (stating that, for
ambiguity to exist, "the contrary positions of the parties must each be tenable").
Thus, a court must look at the entire document as well as at "all relevant evidence"

2

A court can consider and interpret a contract in a Rule 12(b)(6) setting if, for instance,
neither party proffers any "other relevant evidence" regarding the parties' intentions at the
time of contracting, or if, for instance, the "other evidence" relevant to the parties' intentions
at the time of contracting is attached to, or referred to in, the Complaint or other pleadings.
See Utah R. Civ. P. 10(c) (stating that documents attached as exhibits to pleadings are "a part
thereof for all purposes"); see also Oakwood Village LLC v. Albertsons. Inc., 2004 UT 101,
^[13,104 P.3d 1226. If, on the other hand, the evidence relevant to the parties' intentions at
the time of contracting are "matters outside the pleading," a court may not consider those
materials within the context of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, and must then treat the motion as a
summary judgment motion brought under Rule 56. See Utah R. Civ P. 12 (stating that if a
court considers "matters outside the pleading," then "the motion shall be treated as one for
summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given
reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56").
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submitted to it in order to determine whether a contract is ambiguous. After considering that
contract and that evidence, if the court determines that the two parties espouse differing yet
reasonable interpretations of the contract, then the contract is ambiguous, and the court
cannot interpret the contract as a matter of law on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.
B.

Without Considering "All Relevant Evidence," the District Court Made
the Determination That the Settlement Agreement is Unambiguous

The district court did not follow these basic rules in this case. The district court
refused to consider "all relevant evidence" related to the intentions of the parties at the time
of contracting, and instead limited its review merely to the four corners of the document.
This alone was error.

The district court compounded the error by then making a

determination, without considering the letters or the Jeffs Affidavit, that the Settlement
Agreement was unambiguous and could be construed in Mona's favor as a matter of law.
Mona argued below that the issue of ambiguity was not raised before the district court,
and that the district court, therefore, did not ever actually rule that the. Settlement Agreement
was unambiguous. See R. at 370. This argument is belied by the record, as well as by the
realities of the situation. In its ruling denying Appellants' motion for reconsideration,
wherein Appellants had raised and discussed the ambiguity issues at length, see id. at 385-91
(citing, inter alia, Ward and Novell), the district court ruled that the Settlement Agreement
"is plain on its face." Id. at 398 (emphasis added). This ruling, made explicit in the Ruling
on the motion for reconsideration, was by definition an implied part of the court's initial
determination that the Settlement Agreement could be construed on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.
During litigation on the motion to dismiss, both parties argued that the Settlement Agreement
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was unambiguous—but both parties argued for divergent meanings of the document. No
party used the word "ambiguous" in argument on the motion to dismiss, because both parties
thought that the document could be unambiguously interpreted in their favor. In order to rule
as it did—that the Settlement Agreement had definitive meaning as a matter of law on a Rule
12 motion—the district court necessarily had to find that the document was unambiguous.
See Plateau Min. Co.. 802 P.2d at 725 (stating that "[w]hen ambiguity does exist, the intent
of the parties is a question of fact to be determined by the jury").
The district court reached this ruling—that the Settlement Agreement is unambiguous
in Mona's favor—without considering any evidence other than the Settlement Agreement
itself. Despite the mandate of the Utah Supreme Court to consider "all relevant evidence"
in making this threshold determination of ambiguity, the district court went ahead and found
that the Settlement Agreement was unambiguous without considering Jeffs' viewpoint on the
matter. Jeffs was not a party to the litigation at that point (he had been sued but never served)
and had not filed any pleadings in the matter. He was, however, in the courtroom, and
counsel for Appellants on two separate occasions made note of this fact and urged the district
court to entertain Jeffs' testimony that Jeffs (on behalf of Clyde) and Appellants had, at the
time of drafting, reached a meeting of the minds regarding the meaning of the Settlement
Agreement and regarding which claims Appellants had agreed to waive, but the court did not
allow it. Counsel also offered to introduce some of Jeffs' letters into evidence, but the court
refused to allow that either.3

3
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In short, the district court made a determination that the Settlement Agreement was
unambiguous in Mona' s favor without ever considering the viewpoint espoused by Jeffs, who
had served as Clyde's personal attorney and confidant, Trustee of the Trust, and (along with
Appellants' counsel) as one of the two primary drafters of the Settlement Agreement itself.
Surely Jeffs' testimony that Clyde and Appellants had, at the time of drafting, come to a
meeting of the minds regarding waived claims was "relevant evidence" as to the meaning of
the terms of the Settlement Agreement, and the district court was obligated to consider Jeffs'
testimony before determining that the document was unambiguous. The district court's
refusal to do so is reversible error.
C.

The District Court's Determination that the Settlement Agreement Is
Unambiguous in Mona's Favor Was Erroneous

The district court's first error was refusing to consider Mr. Jeffs' viewpoint—clearly
"relevant evidence"—in making its determination that the Settlement Agreement is
unambiguous, as mandated by Ward and its progeny. The district court's second error was

3

(...continued)
pursuant to the district court's periodic rotation) speculated as to why Judge Davis refused
to consider the Jeffs Affidavit and the other extrinsic evidence proffered, stating as follows:
Well, and perhaps precisely why Judge Davis [rejected the motion to
reconsider as well [is] because he's already ruled that it's an integrated
agreement and so it doesn't matter what Mr. Jeffs had to say about
contemporaneous representations about the resolution of disputes and intent
of the parties, because this is an integrated agreement.
See R. at 485, p.41. As discussed above, however, Ward and its progeny require that district
courts consider all evidence relevant to the parties intentions when determining whether a
document is ambiguous, regardless of whether the document is integrated. See Ward, 907
P.2d at 268. The district court simply ignored Ward and its progeny.
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its actual determination that the Settlement Agreement is unambiguous in Mona's favor.
When the entire document is examined, along with the parties' and Mr. Jeffs' respective
interpretations, it becomes clear that the Settlement Agreement is, at a minimum, ambiguous,
and cannot be interpreted as a matter of law in the context of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.
The precise question the district court endeavored to decide is what effect the
Settlement Agreement had, if any, on the Trust and on Appellants' right to receive bequests
through the Trust. At the time the Settlement Agreement was executed, Appellants were the
remainder beneficiaries, under the Trust, of the California Condominium and the Utah
County Property.4 Appellants' interpretation of the Settlement Agreement, shared by Jeffs
(on behalf of Clyde), has always been that the document does not purport to limit either
Clyde's right to bequeath any of his assets to any person, including Appellants, through the
Trust, or Appellants' rights to receive property by bequest through the Trust. Mona takes a
different view, and maintains that the Settlement Agreement did cut off those rights, and that
Appellants waived any claim they might have, through the Trust or otherwise, to the
California Condominium and the Utah County Property.

4

The Settlement Agreement itself, on its face, recites that Mona and Appellants were the
beneficiaries of the Trust at the time of execution. See R. at 084 (Recital D, stating that "[a]s
of the date of execution of this Agreement,... the Trust beneficiaries are as stated in the
Trust, as amended"). Appellants alleged in their Petition that they were and are the
remainder beneficiaries under the Trust. Id. at 038 (paragraph 4). While Mona claims in her
Answer and elsewhere that the Trust was actually amended in 2001 by the three 2001
documents to give the entire Trust corpus to Mona, those claims are vigorously disputed by
Appellants, who claim in their Petition that the three 2001 documents are fraudulent and of
no force and effect. Id. at 033-34. In any event, for the purposes of deciding a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion, the district court had to assume, and apparently did assume, that Appellants, at the
time they entered into the agreement, were the remainder beneficiaries under the Trust.
680078v1

-26-

Various phrases in the Settlement Agreement nicely frame the ambiguity. On the one
hand, the Settlement Agreement contains these provisions:
"the Trust beneficiaries are as stated in the Trust, as amended." See R. at 084
(Recital D).
"This Agreement shall not, in any manner, restrict, impair, or limit Clyde's
right or ability to distribute any of his property by lifetime transfer, will or
other testamentary disposition, or in any other manner, to any person or persons
of his choosing." Id. at 082 (Paragraph 5).
On the other hand, the Settlement Agreement contains these provisions:
•

Appellants agreed to waive their claims "against Clyde and Mona of
entitlement to present or immediate testamentary interests in the Coronado
Condominium and the Clyde Residence." Id. (Recital 1.8).

•

Appellants "release[d] any claim, rights or title in and to the Clyde Residence
and the Coronado Condominium. Clyde, and the Trustee, acknowledge
delivery by Scott and Becky of a quit claim deed to the Coronado
Condominium transferring to the Trustee, for the Trust, any right, title or
interest of [Appellants] in the record title to the Coronado Condominium." Id.
at 082 (Paragraph 4).
1.

Even without consideration of the Jeffs Affidavit, Appellants'
interpretation is tenable and reasonable, while Mona's proffered
interpretation reads new language into the Settlement Agreement
and ignores Paragraph 5.

Even without taking Jeffs' testimony into account, Appellants' proffered interpretation
is tenable and reasonable. Appellants pointed out to the district court that the phrases relied
upon by Mona were intended to refer to an entirely separate claim by Appellants to the
California Condominium and the Utah County Property—a claim, arising from a separate
dispute with Clyde, that Appellants (rather than the Trust) had present fee simple entitlement
to the property—and were not intended to refer to any rights Appellants may have had, or
may have in the future, to inherit a remainder interest in the property through the Trust.
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Indeed, Paragraph 4 itself states that Appellants will deliver a quit-claim deed to the Trust,
and, when that language is examined in tandem with the "present and immediate testamentary
interest" language in Recital 1.8 and the language of Paragraph 5 (which explicitly reserves
Clyde's right to use the Trust to bequeath any property to any person), it is clear that the
effect of the Settlement Agreement's various provisions, taken together, was to have
Appellants waive the other claims they had to the California Condominium and the Utah
County Property, but not any rights they may have in the future to that same property through
the Trust.
Mona's proffered interpretation, by contrast, reads language into the Settlement
Agreement that is not there, and fails to give effect to all of the document's other provisions.
Mona's interpretation has the effect of implicitly amending the Trust to remove Appellants
as beneficiaries. However, there is no language in the Settlement Agreement that amends the
Trust or that removes Appellants as remainder beneficiaries thereunder.
Moreover, Mona's proffered interpretation is squarely at odds with Paragraph 5 of the
Settlement Agreement. As noted above, courts must interpret the entire contract "with a view
toward giving effect to all [of the contract's provisions] and ignoring none." See Plateau
Min. Co., 802 P.2d at 725. An interpretation that blatantly ignores one entire paragraph
violates this cardinal rule and is therefore improper. Clyde expressly retained the right to
leave the Trust beneficiaries unchanged and allow the California Condominium and/or the
Utah County Property to run to Appellants, through the existing Trust, upon Mona's death,
if he so chose. However, Mona's proffered interpretation takes that right from Clyde, in clear
contravention of the Settlement Agreement's plain language.
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Thus, even if one were to restrict review to the four corners of the Settlement
Agreement, the Agreement's actual terms are far more in line with Appellants' interpretation
than they are with Mona's. Appellants' interpretation is, at a minimum, tenable and
reasonable, and therefore the district court erred in construing the contract against them as
a matter of law on a Rule 12 motion.
2.

Consideration of "all relevant evidence," including the Jeffs
Affidavit, cements Appellants' interpretation as the correct one.

When one expands the inquiry, as commanded by the Utah Supreme Court, beyond
the four corners of the document to "all relevant evidence," it becomes even more clear that
the Settlement Agreement is, at a minimum, ambiguous, and that Appellants' interpretation
is more than merely "tenable" or "reasonable." Indeed, it becomes clear that Appellants'
interpretation should ultimately prevail as the correct one.
Jeffs is Clyde's longtime friend, attorney, and confidant. Clyde appointed Jeffs to be
the Trustee of the Trust, and Clyde had many conversations with Jeffs about his wishes for
the Trust and about his relationships with Appellants. Jeffs was integrally involved in the
drafting of the Settlement Agreement and its December 2001 predecessor. Jeffs had
conversations with Clyde about the Trust and the Settlement Agreement in the weeks
following its execution. In short, there is probably no witness better positioned than Jeffs to
give testimony regarding Clyde's intent in entering into the Settlement Agreement.
Jeffs' testimony bolsters Appellants' interpretation of the Settlement Agreement, and
is completely at odds with Mona's. Indeed, Jeffs' testimony, coupled with Appellants',
makes plain that Clyde and Appellants had come to a meeting of the minds regarding the
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effect of the Settlement Agreement. Jeffs is "certain" that Clyde did not intend, through the
Settlement Agreement, to amend the Trust, eliminate Appellants as beneficiaries under the
Trust, or impair Clyde's ability to convey any of his assets to any person, including
Appellants. See R. at 281. Jeffs also backs up Appellants' interpretation of the Settlement
Agreement's effect on Appellants' claims to the California Condominium and the Utah
County Property; Jeffs (and Clyde) understood that Appellants were only waiving their
separate claims to present and immediate title to the property, and did not understand that
Appellants were waiving any existing or future rights they might have to inherit property
through the Trust. Id.
If the district court had considered Jeffs' testimony, it would have been impossible for
it to conclude that the Settlement Agreement was unambiguous in Mona's favor. In reality,
Jeffs' affidavit is devastating to Mona's interpretation, and establishes Appellants'
interpretation as the correct one. At a bare minimum, Jeffs' affidavit makes Appellants'
interpretation "tenable" and "reasonable" for the purposes of an ambiguity determination, and
makes it impossible for the district court to construe the Settlement Agreement in Mona's
favor on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.
Thus, the district court's determination that the Settlement Agreement was
unambiguous, and could be interpreted as a matter of law in Mona's favor on a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion, was erroneous and should be reversed. At a minimum, the Settlement Agreement
is ambiguous, and therefore its interpretation must await discovery and testimony regarding
its meaning.
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II.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEYS' FEES TO
MONA
Finally, the district court should not have awarded attorneys' fees to Mona. The

district court's award of attorneys' fees was based on an erroneous ruling that the Settlement
Agreement could be unambiguously interpreted in Mona's favor on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.
This ruling is wrong, and should be reversed for the reasons set forth above. Because Mona
should not have been the prevailing party on the motion, the district court's award of
attorneys' fees in Mona's favor should be reversed as well.
CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, the district court's order granting Mona's Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss should be reversed, and the attendant order granting Mona
attorneys' fees and costs should also be reversed. This case should be remanded for further
proceedings, including discovery as to the intent and meaning of the Settlement Agreement,
and trial.
/4k
DATED this [p day of September, 2005.
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH

By

\KQiAA7

Jeffrey/W\ Shields
Andre^v H) Stone
Ryan lHj?larris
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants

680078v1

-31-

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

/ 4h
\Q day of September, 2005,1 caused to be sent, via

hand-delivery, two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT
to the following:
Benson L. Hathaway, Jr.
Thomas A. Mecham
Karina F. Landward
KIRTON & McCONKIE
1800 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
P.O. Box 45120
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120
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SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND MUTUAL RELEASE
This Settlement Agreement and Mutual Release ("Agreement") is executed effective
January^?^<2002 by and between: Clyde Martin Lunceford Properties, LLC, a Utah limited
liability company ("LLC"), standing alone and as successor in interest to Clyde M. Lunceford
Family Properties, LP, a Utah limited partnership ("LP"); Clyde M. Lunceford, an individual,
individually and as settlor of the Clyde M. Lunceford Trust ("Clyde"); M. Dayle Jeffs, as trustee
of the Clyde M. Lunceford Trust, as amended ("Trustee"); Scott A. Lunceford, an individual
("Scott"); Rebecca J. Lunceford, an individual ("Becky"); Debra Lunceford Harker, an individual
("Debra"); Richard Harker, an individual ("Richard"); Mona Vincent Lunceford ("Mona"); and
For Every Body, LLC, a Utah limited liability company ("FEB").
RECITALS:
A.

The LLC is the owner of certain real property and personal property assets,
including, but not by way of limitation, the following:
1)

Receivables, contract rights, optionor rights and related interests arising
from periodic disposition of approximately 60 acres of land located in
Utah County, State of Utah, commonly known as "Lunceford Orchards"
("Development Property") that was and is owned by the LLC;

2)

Certain unsold water stock and water interests in the West Union Canal
Company (collectively "Water Rights") consisting of /Q shares held in
the name of the LLC;

3)

Cash, cash equivalents, investment instalments, and life insurance and
annuity interests, housed at and administered by Merrill Lynch and
otherwise as held;

4)

Successor rights to assets owned, or currently owned, by the LP;

5)

All other assets and rights, contingent or otherwise, of any kind or nature
whatsoever.

All of the foregoing are hereinafter collectively referred to as the "LLC Assets."
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B.

The LLC is the successor in interest to the LP.

C.

Clyde holds a membership interest of approximately 4.75 percent in the LLC and
formerly held an equivalent percentage partnership interest in the LP. In addition
to Clyde, the members of the LLC are Scott, Becky, Debra, and Richard. Scott is
the sole manager of the LLC.
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D.

Clyde established the Clyde M. Lunceford Trust ("Trust") as its settlor on or about
December 3, 1999. By amendment to Trust dated July 21, 2001, Clyde executed
an agreement restating the Trust in its entirety. By Second Amendment to the
Trust dated August 20, 2001, Clyde removed himself and Scott as the co-trustees
of the Trust and appointed the Trustee as the trustee of the Trust. As of the date
of execution of this Agreement, the Trustee continues to serve as trustee of the
Trust and the Trust beneficiaries are as stated in the Trust, as amended.

E.

Clyde previously acquired ownership of a condominium located in the Coronado
Shores project in Coronado, San Diego County, California, known as 1810
Avenida Del Mundo, Unit No. 206, Coronado, San Diego, California ("Coronado
Condominium"). Clyde also acquired ownership of his personal residence and
certain real property surrounding it located in Orem, Utah County, State'of Utah,
known as 230 East 2050 South, Orem, Utah County, State of Utah, which
property is contiguous to the Development Property and consisting of
approximately 2 acre[s] ("Clyde Residence").

F.

Mona is married to Clyde. Prior to their marriage, Clyde and Mona entered into
that certain Antenuptial Agreement dated August 26, 1980. The Antenuptial
Agreement gives to Mona certain distribution rights in Clyde's estate upon
Clyde's death.

G.

FEB is a Utah limited liability company of which Scott and Becky are members.

H.

The Trust currently owns the Coronado Condominium and the Clyde Residence.

L

Certain disputes arose between the parties to this agreement, and although
litigation was threatened, litigation has not been commenced. These disputes
include, but are not limited to, the following:
1)

Claims by Clyde that Scott, Becky and/or Debra mismanaged the LLC and
the LP, breached certain fiduciary duties as managers, entered into
unauthorized transactions involving the assets of the LLC, and otherwise
failed to properly carry out duties to the LLC and its members and the LP
and its partners;

2)

Claims by Clyde that FEB, Scott and Becky improperly obtained loans
from the LLC or otherwise improperly used the cash or assets of the LLC
for purposes not related to the LLC;

3)

Claims by Clyde that he is entitled to a monthly income from the LLC,
payment of living expenses of he and Mona, and payment of debt and
expenses relating to the Coronado Condominium;

2
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4)

Claims by Debra, Richard, Becky and Scott that Clyde interfered with the
operations of the LLC and LP, overdrew his capital account in the LLC
and LP, improperly dealt with LLC and LP assets and opportunities, and
otherwise breached fiduciary duties to the LLC and LP;

5)

Claims by Scott and Debra that Mona exercised improper and undue
influence over Clyde to their prejudice as the natural heirs of Clyde and
otherwise improperly interfered with family business affairs;

6)

Claims by Clyde that Scott, Becky and/or Debra improperly denied to him
access to records and other information concerning the LLC's operations
and affairs;

7)

Claims by Scott, Becky and FEB that Clyde and his agents defamed or
disparaged them and their businesses;

8)

Claims by Scott and Debra against Clyde and Mona of entitlement to
present or immediate testamentary interests in the Coronado
Condominium and the Clyde Residence.

The foregoing paragraphs are hereinafter collectively referred to as the "Claims".
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J.

Each of the parties has denied the Claims asserted against them by the other
parties and have vigorously denied and defended, at all times, all Claims asserted
against them.

K.

The parties have reached certain terms of settlement of their claims and disputes
with respect to the Claims and other matters related to the Claims by them. Clyde
and Scott executed a settlement term sheet on December 14, 2001, and desiring to
memorialize such terms, and being mindful of the uncertainty and expense of
further dispute and litigation of disputed claims, and in accordance with such term
sheet, make and enter into the agreements below.

3

COVENANTS AND AGREEMENTS
WHEREFORE, the parties to this Agreement covenant and agree as follows:
1.
Payment of Money. For and in consideration of the agreements and
performances of Clyde under this agreement, the LLC, upon execution of this Agreement by all
parties, will pay to Clyde the total sum of $356,158.
2.
Transfer of Clyde's LLC Interest Clyde will, upon execution of this
Agreement by all parties, transfer his entire membership interest, and all rights and entitlements
to any interest in the LLC and the LP, and to their respective assets, to the LLC, and will execute
a transfer agreement essentially in the form attached hereto as Exhibit A.
3.
LLC Consent. Clyde, Scott, Becky, Debra and Richard, as members oTthe LLC,
shall, upon execution of this Agreement by all parties, execute a unanimous written consent
ratifying and approving entry of the LLC into this Agreement and performance of the LLC's
obligations under this Agreement on the form of unanimous written consent appended as Exhibit
B. Scott, Becky, Richard and Debra shall execute a Consent for Transfer of Interest on the form
appended as Exhibit C.
4.
Release of Claims to Condominium and Residence. Scott, Becky, Debra and
Richard, individually and collectively, release any claim, rights or title in and to the Clyde
Residence and the Coronado Condominium. Clyde, and the Trustee, acknowledge delivery by
Scott and Becky of a quit claim deed to the Coronado Condominium transferring to the Trustee,
for the Trust, any right, title or interest of Scott and Becky in the record title to the Coronado
Condominium.
5.
No Restriction on Right of Disposition. This Agreement shall not, in any
manner, restrict, impair, or limit Clyde's right or ability to distribute any of his property by
lifetime transfer, will or other testamentary disposition, or in any other manner, to any person or
persons of his choosing. Except as provided in paragraph 6, this Agreement shall not serve to
limit or modify Mona's rights under the Prenuptial Agreement with respect to the separate
property of Clyde Lunceford as constituted after execution and performance of this Agreement..
6.
Waiver of Certain Rights by Mona. Mona waives and surrenders any rights she
may have, in law or equity, to assert claims against the LLC, the LLC Assets, the managers or
members of the LLC, or any other business entity of the Lunceford family, including but not
limited to, all such claims based upon rights of inheritance, common law marital rights,
community property marital rights, rights under the Antenuptual Agreement, or otherwise.
Otherwise stated, Mona may not pursue any claims to collect or realize upon any spousal or
inheritance rights that she has, or may have (including but not limited to elective share,
community property, homestead allowance, exempt property and family allowance) under
common law, the statutory law of any state, or under any agreement between her and Clyde, now
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existing or hereafter made, against the LLC, the LLC Assets, the LP, the Development Property,
Scott, Becky, Richard, Debra, FEB, or any other Lunceford family business entity.
7.
Additional Documentation. The parties agree that in the event it is necessary to
execute any additional documents to carry out the intent of this Agreement, the parties will
reasonably cooperate to draft, execute and, if necessary, record or file such document(s).
8.
Good Faith. All parties shall pursue completion of this Agreement with utmost
good faith and in a timely manner.
9.
General Reciprocal Release. For and consideration of the execution of this
Agreement and the covenants, promises and performances of this Agreement, and except for the
obligations of this Agreement, the parties hereto, and each of them, on behalf of themselves and
on behalf of any and all other agents, successors, attorneys, assigns, representatives, employees,
officers, directors, insurers, members, managers, partners, spouses and heirs, and others^do
hereby release and forever acquit and discharge each other and any and all other individual and
collective past, present, and future officers, directors, parents, subsidiaries, shareholders,
affiliates, partners, attorneys, agents, members, managers, associates, past members, past
associates, former employees, spouses, partners and heirs, and all other persons or entities for
whose conduct any or all of the foregoing may be liable under any theory of law or equity, of and
from any and all liability, rights, claims, commissions or other compensation, demands,
obligations, damages, losses, injuries, costs, expenses, attorneys fees, all actions, causes of
action, controversies of any nature of any kind or description whatsoever, existing, or arising out
of, related to or based upon the parties' dealings with one another from the beginning of time to
the date of execution of this Agreement, including, but not limited to, all known damages, losses,
actions, and causes of action arising out of or related to the Claims, and all asserted and
threatened claims, and any related claims described in the Recitals hereinabove, the same of
which are herein incorporated by reference and made and acknowledged as material terms of this
Agreement. These releases include, but are not limited to, claims between Scott and Becky and
Debra and Richard related to Debra's handling of certain Merrill Lynch accounts or other LLC or
LP accounts. Notwithstanding any of the foregoing, this general release paragraph is not
intended to release any claims based upon the obligations of this Agreement or any act, omission
or matter which occurs after the date of execution of this Agreement.
10.
Unknown Facts. It is expressly agreed and understood that to the extent stated
above, this Agreement releases losses, injuries, damages, and claims of every kind and character
the parties have or may have against each and all other persons or entities from the beginning of
time to the date of execution of this Agreement, for whose conduct they may be liable, arising
from or related to the claims and offenses stated in the Recitals above, and arising from or related
to the Claims. The parties also acknowledge that they may hereafter discover facts which
occurred from the beginning of time to the date of execution of this Agreement, which are
different from, or in addition to, those which they now know to be true, or matters which
underlay the Claims or the potential claims of the parties' alleged injuries, losses or damages, and
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agree that this Agreement and the releases contained herein be and remain effective in all
respects notwithstanding such different or additional facts or the discovery thereof The parties
expressly waive the benefit of any statute or rule of law, if any, which might otherwise limit the
scope of this Agreement because of unknown matters existing from the beginning of time to the
date of execution of this Agreement, whether material or otherwise.
11.
Warranties of the Parties. The parties represent and warrant that they each have
the right and authority to execute this Agreement, that they have not sold, assigned, transferred,
conveyed or otherwise disposed of any of the claims, demands, obligations or causes of action
referred to in the Recitals and elsewhere in this Agreement. All parties executing this
Agreement, or documents required by this Agreement, on behalf of any corporation or other legal
entity, expressly represent that they possess requisite authority under applicable corporate law, to
execute this Agreement and any documents executed in pursuance hereof.
12.
Limitation of Warranties. Except as expressly set forth in this Agreement, the
parties have not made and make no other representations, warranties, statements, promises or
agreements to each other.
13.
Compromise. This Agreement is executed as a compromise settlement of
disputed claims among the parties, liability and responsibility for which is expressly denied by all
parties. The considerations contained herein do not constitute an admission of liability of
wrongdoing on the part of any party.
14.
Applicable Law and Resolution of Disputes. This Agreement is entered into in
the state of Utah and shall be construed and interpreted in accordance with its laws and statutes,
and it is agreed that any disputes relating to this Agreement shall be litigated in state courts
situated in Utah County, State of Utah.
15.
No Waiver. No failure of any party to insist upon the strict performance of any
performance, duty, agreement or condition of this Agreement, or to exercise any right or remedy
upon the breach thereof, shall constitute a waiver of any breach of this Agreement.
16.
Counterparts and Facsimile Signatures. This Agreement may be signed with
any number of counterparts with the same effect as if the signatures upon any counterpart were
upon the same instrument. All signed counterparts shall be deemed to be one original.
Signatures sent by facsimile shall become part of this Agreement and shall be deemed original
signatures. However, any party executing this Agreement and transmitting such signature by
facsimile shall mail the original signature to their counsel of record for inclusion into the
counterpart signatures.
17.
Attorney's Fees. In the event any action or proceeding is brought by any party to
enforce the provisions of this Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover
its/his/her costs and reasonable attorney's fees, whether such sums are expended with or without
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suit, at trial, arbitration, or on appeal.
18.
Integration and Entire Agreement. This Agreement sets forth the entire
agreement and understanding between and among the parties hereto with respect to the subject
matter hereof and supersedes all prior written and oral agreements, term sheets, negotiations and
understandings; shall be binding upon the successors, assigns, heirs, and personal representatives
of the parties, and may not be rescinded, cancelled, terminated, supplemented, amended, or
modified in any manner whatsoever without the prior written consent of all parties.
19.
Hold Harmless. The LLC shall assume and hold Clyde harmless from all tax
obligations incurred by the LLC from disposition of the Development Property and disposition of
the water rights or other water interests. Clyde shall assume and hold the LLC, Scott, Becky,
Debra and Richard harmless from taxes incurred or assessments against the Coronado
Condominium and the Clyde Property.
20.
Execution of Water Rights Documents. Clyde specifically agrees to execute,
within 48 hours of demand and presentment by the LLC, all documents, resolutions, minutes or
other documents required to sell, transfer or encumber the remaining unsold Water Rights all to
the benefit of the LLC.
21.
Exhibits. The exhibits attached to this Agreement are expressly made a part of
this Agreement as though completely set forth herein. All references to this Agreement shall be
deemed to refer to and include all such exhibits.
22.
Successors. This Agreement is binding on the heirs, successors, assigns, and
personal representatives of each party to this Agreement.
23.
Non-Severabilitv. Each term of this Agreement is dependant upon each other
term hereof. This Agreement is not severable and shall be construed and performed as a single
integrated agreement.
24.
Notices. All notices, requests, demand and other communications hereunder shall
be in writing and shall be given (1) by Federal Express (or other established express delivery
service which maintains delivery records); (2) hand-delivery; or (3) by certified" or registered
mail, postage prepaid, return receipt requested, to the parties at the following addresses, or at
such other addresses as the parties may designate by written notice in this matter.
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To Becky, Scott, and FEB:
Scott A. Lunceford
Rebecca C. Lunceford
For Every Body, LLC
75 West 560 South
Orem,Utah 84058
With a copy to:
Jeffrey Weston Shields, Esq.
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough
170 South Main Street, Suite 1500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Facsimile: 801-328-0537
To Debra and/or Richard:
Richard Harker
Debra Harker
1771 South 290 East
Orem,Utah 84058
To Clyde:
Clyde M. Lunceford
230 East 2050 South
Orem,Utah 84058
With a Copy to:
M. Dayle Jeffs, Esq.
Jeffs & Jeffs
90 North 100 East
P.O. Box 888
Provo.Utah 84603
To the Trustee and the Trust:
Clyde M. Lunceford Trust
Attn: M. Dayle Jeffs, Esq.
Jeffs & Jeffs
90 North 100 East
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P.O. Box 888
Provo, Utah 84603
With a Copy to:
M. Dayle Jeffs
Jeffs & Jeffs
90 North 100 East
P.O. Box 888
Provo, Utah 84603
To Mona:
Mona Vincent Lunceford

1J63
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To the LLC:
Clyde Martin Lunceford Properties, LLC
Attn: Scott M. Lunceford, Manager
75 West 560 South
Provo, Utah 84058
With a Copy to:
Jeffrey Weston Shields, Esq.
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough
170 South Main Street, Suite 1500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Facsimile: 801-328-0537
Such-communications may also be given by facsimile transmission, provided that any
such communication is concurrently given by one of the above methods. Notices shall be
deemed-effective upon receipt or upon attempted delivery thereof. If delivery is refused by the
intended recipient, or delivery is impossible because the intended recipient has failed to provide a
reasonable means for accomplishing delivery, delivery shall, nevertheless, be considered to have
been made.
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this Agreement as of the date in the
year last above written.
Clyde Martin Lunceford Properties, LLC

By:_
Scott A. L u n c e f o r d * y
Its Manager

Clyde M. Lunceford Family Properties, LP
By:
Scott A. Lunceford ^
Its: General Partner

/

Its: Manager
Clyde M. Lunceford Trust

M. Dayle Jeffi£ Truste;
Clyde M. Lunceford Trust

By:
Cffle M. Lunceford
Settlor

VJ^SMO^V VU^c«\"^
Debra Lunceford Harker

<^«> >A*Jj

WV^OAA

Richard Harker
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)tt A. Lunceford

lona Vincent Lunceford
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M. DAYLE JEFFS
DAVID D.JEFFS
ROBERT l . JEFFS
WILLIAM M. JEFFS
RODNEY W. RIVERS
JOHN H ROMNEY

90 NORTH 100 EAST

P 0 Box 888

TELEPHONE (SOD 373-8848
FACSIMILE 1801) 373-8878

PROVO, UTAH 84603

March 10, 2003

Mr. Thomas Mecham
KIRTON & McCONKIE
1800 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
P.O. Box 45120
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0120
Deai- Mr. Mecham:
Thank you for the documents you provided me by your letter of March 4, 2003. I had not
seen any of those previous to that time. I have gone through my entire file and do not find that I ever
received the February 23, 2001, letter from Clyde Lunceford, nor the March 3, 2001, letter from
Clyde. The April 3, 2001, document entitled "To Whom It May Concern" appears to have been
recorded as pages 2 and 3 of some other document. That appears to be about the time that a deed
was recorded attempting to transfer the home and the condo at Coronado out of the trust into the title
of Clyde and Mona. It is my understanding, that recording was rejected by the County Recorder in
San Diego on the basis that it did not have the Trustee of the Trust, Scott Lunceford, signature.
At that time, I met with Clyde and Mona and as a result of that recording, Scott ceased
making monthly payment to Clyde and Mona of $4,000.00 a month. I then met with Clyde and
Mona and discussed that it seemed to me that if the properties were back into the trust and if they
had a Trustee that was neither Clyde nor Scott that perhaps we could prevail upon Scott to
recommence the $4,000.00 a month payments for their living expenses. As a result of that, Clyde
asked me if I would act as that Trustee and I agreed to do so. After that, I prepared an Amendment
to the Trust and a deed conveying both properties to the Trust.
From that time, until his death, I had perhaps two and three other conversations with Clyde
about his desires upon his death and the status of the Premarital Agreement and the fact that the
Skabelund drafted trust provided the life estate for Mona in the condominium at Coronado. During

Mr. Thomas Mecham
March 10, 2003
Page 2
those conversations, at no time did he instruct me to prepare an amendment to the trust to provide
that either the Coronado condominium or the home in Orem should be given out right to Mona.
Very truly yours,
JEFFS & JEFFS, P.C.

M. Dayle Jeffs
MDJ/laj
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M. DAYLE JEFFS

90 NORTH 100 EAST

DAVID D. JEFFS

P. 0. BOX 888

ROBERT L JEFFS

PROVO, UTAH 84603

TELEPHONE (801) 373-8848

FACSIMILE (801) 373-8878

WILLIAM M. JEFFS
RODNEY W. RIVERS
JOHN H. ROMNEY

May 16, 2003

Mr. Jeffrey Weston Shields
BALLARD, SPAHR, ANDREWS & INGERSOLL, LLP
One Utah Center, Suite 600
201 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2221
Ms. Dehbie Harker
1771 South 290 East
Orem, UT 84058
Re:

Clyde Lun ceford

Dear Mr. Shields and Ms. Harker:
Would you please communicate this letter to your client, Scott Lunceford. As I have
evaluated the trust created by Mr. Skabelund and the potential conflicts between yourselves as the
residuary beneficiaries and Mona Lunceford as the life estate holder of the Coronado condo, I have
the following observations:
1.
The Trust of which I am now the primary Trustee, requires that I convey a life estate
to Mona in the Coronado condo that she is entitled to receive the rents off that property and the Trust
is to pay all of the expenses including, taxes, insurance, and condo fees, as well as maintenance. The
Trust has no cash with which to comply with that directive.
2.
The home in Orem could be sold if the buried gasoline tanks could be removed and
receive an EPA certification of non-contamination.
3.
The Trust requires that the Trustee disburse everything after Clyde's death to the
beneficiaries which are Scott and Debbie and yet is required to hold in Trust funds to meet the
expense items on the Coronado condo.

Mr. Jeffrey Weston Shields
May 16, 2003
Page 2
4.
Upon the passing of Mona, the condo is to be distributed to Debbie and Scott. Mona
has indicated she is going to exercise her right to receive the rentalsfreeof all expenses and has been
doing so since before Clyde's death having not delivered any of those rental funds to me as Trustee
despite my prior requests.
5.
Mona's counsel has indicated and he has provided me with copies of letters ostensibly
sent to me by Clyde more than a year prior to Ids death requesting his Trust be changed to make
Mona the sole beneficiary. Mona's counsel indicated she believes those are a declaration of intent
and a defacto amendment to the Trust, although some of those communications he admits were never
given to me.
6.
My own file notes indicate that subsequent to those claimed letters of instruction, I
had conversation with Clyde, in which he had not decided what he was going to do about the
beneficiaries of his Trust after his death and in fact he even discussed the possibility that he might
want to leave the residual amounts in the Trust to his grandchildren. He never gave specific
directions to me to amend the Trust to accomplish what Mona now says was his intent.
Given the potential conflicts and the potential dispute over the 2001 taxes, it appears to me
that I could not safely proceed in the decision making without directionfromthe Court, which would
necessitate that Ifilea declaratory judgment action asking the Court to interpret the Skabelund Trust
and give me guidance and direction as to how I am to proceed. If I were to bring such an action, they
would incur the legal expenses of myself as Trustee and of counsel that I employed as well as Mona
to employ counsel and you to employ counsel. This appears to me to multiply the potential expenses
of all of the parties.
Mona, through counsel, has also asserted that she is going to present claims against the Trust
estate of approximately $170,000.00, including the amounts that Clyde paid to pay off the mortgage
on the Coronado condo and expenses for his care and keeping as asserted by Mona and that she is
going to claim that the funds that were paid in settlement of the dispute between you and Clyde were
placed pursuant to Clyde's instruction into an account in which he was not a signatory on the account
and thus she claims those funds are her separate funds and even though they were expended to pay
off the Coronado mortgage and his own expenses, that she has a claim for reimbursement against
the Trust.
It appears to me that the dispute is really a dispute between Clyde's children, whom he left
his residual estate to and Mona Lunceford over the assets in the Trust estate and their utilization.
Counsel for Mona has indicated that he believes that if I were to resign as Trustee that Mona
would be the successor Trustee. As such, she could take control of those assets, could recognize her
own claim, and pay them from any funds derived from the sale of the properties and make our own
decisions regarding the sale of the home and the removal of the gasoline tanks.

Mr. Jeffrey Weston Shields
May 16, 2003
Page 3
I do not have any desire to increase the legal and Trustee expenses of the Trust nor to
participate in a litigation that is really a dispute between the heirs. I am writing you to let you know
that I am contemplating resigning, but that you may want to consider with your counsel whether or
not you would be adversely affected by such resignation and let me know your feeling on my
intended resignation.
It also occurs to me that if there continues to be a dispute over the payment of the taxes on
the monies that were paid in the settlement between you and Clyde, that I may be a witness in such
dispute and perhaps compromise from my impartiality required of a independent trustee.
Very truly yours,
JEFFS & JEFFS, P.C
. ; &

M. Dayle Jeffs
MDJ/laj
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
Scott A. Lunceford, and Deborah Lunceford
Harker,
RULING ON DEFENDANT MONA
VINCENT LUNCEFORD'S MOTION TO
DISMISS PLAINTIFFS' PETITION AND
COMPLAINT

Plaintiffs,
vs.
Mona Vincent Lunceford, an individual; and M.
Dayle Jeffs, in his capacity as Trustee of the
Clyde M. Lunceford Trust,
Defendants.

Civil No. 030404549
Mona Vincent Lunceford,
Judge Lynn W. Davis
Counterclaimant,
vs.
Plaintiff Scott A. Lunceford, and Deborah
Lunceford Harker,
Counterclaim defendants.

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Mona Vincent Lunceford's Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiffs Scott A. Lunceford's and Deborah Lunceford's Petition and Complaint. The
Court having carefully considered the Motions and Memoranda, and having heard oral arguments
on the matter, now makes the following ruling.
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I.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Petition and Complaint on March 22, 2004.
Plaintiff responded by filing a memorandum in opposition on April 2, 2004. Defendant filed a
reply memorandum and submitted the matter to the Court on April 19, 2004. Oral arguments were
then held before the Court on June 22, 2004, after which the Court took this matter under
advisement.
II.
FACTUAL SUMMARY

1.

Clyde Lunceford ("Clyde"), Defendant's now-deceased husband, executed a revocable
trust ("Trust") in July of 2000. In December 2000, Clyde executed the First Amendment to
the Trust. On August 10,2001, Clyde executed a Second Amendment to the Trust.
(There is some dispute as to whether handwritten and typewritten letters dated after
August 10, 2001 actually amended the Trust. Plaintiff has further alleged that such letters
were fraudulently created).

2.

Plaintiff, Defendant, and several other individuals had various business and personal
dealings with one another and, over time, asserted interest in various pieces of property.
The relationships between the aforementioned individuals severely and significantly
deteriorated to the point that legal disputes arose. Such disputes included, among other
claims, a claim that Defendant exercised improper influence over Clyde and improperly
interfered with the family business in addition to a claim that Plaintiff was entitled to an
interest in a condominium in Coronado, California, and a local residence.

3.

These claims, and a host of other claims, were resolved through a settlement agreement
executed by the parties and intended to be effective January 22, 2002 ("Settlement
Agreement"). The Settlement Agreement expressly and specifically references the
Coronado, California condominium and the local residence. That is abundantly clear. The
Settlement Agreement is very comprehensive, but also very, very precise. These Plaintiffs
released and waived "any claim, rights or title in or to the Clyde Residence and the
Coronado Condominium."

4.

The parties indicated that the Settlement Agreement was a far-reaching document that set
forth the entire agreement and understanding between the parties with respect to the claims
discussed supra. It is important to note that these Plaintiffs were represented by legal
counsel and the Settlement Agreement was entered into with the advice of counsel.
2

5.

The Settlement Agreement also provided that if an action was brought to enforce the
provisions of the Agreement, the prevailing party would recover their costs and attorney's
fees.

6.

On October 14, 2003, Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the Defendant alleging that Plaintiff is
a beneficiary under the Trust at issue and that Defendant improperly influenced Clyde in a
manner that prejudiced Plaintiff.

7.

While the claims are primarily asserted by Plaintiff Scott A. Lunceford, the Motion to
Dismiss seeks a dismissal as to both Plaintiffs.
III.
ANALYSIS
A.

DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENTS

Defendant argues that the Complaint should be dismissed because Plaintiff has failed to
state any claim upon which relief can be granted. Defendant contends that Plaintiff is barred from
asserting his present claims and dismissing the Plaintiffs' Petition and Complaint is appropriate
because 1) the Settlement Agreement clearly and unequivocally terminated Plaintiffs' claims in
exchange for valuable consideration, 2) all of Plaintiffs' claims focus on behavior that occurred
before the execution of the Settlement Agreement and 3) the Settlement Agreement is a complete
and fully integrated understanding between the parties and is fully enforceable under Utah law.
Defendant further asserts that the Settlement Agreement should be broadly interpreted, in
accordance with the Settlement Agreement's expansive language, which clearly indicates the
parties intended to resolve all present and future claims identified in the Settlement Agreement,
including the extinguishment of "any claim rights or title" in the Clyde Residence and the
Coronado Condominium.
Defendant explains that Plaintiffs' claims, even if premised on future interests in the trust,
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are still precluded under the Settlement Agreement because Plaintiffs' interests, as a matter of law,
were vested present interests at the time the Settlement Agreement was signed. Defendant
contends that even if Plaintiffs were not aware of relevant documents (documents that Plaintiffs
believe are forgeries), Plaintiffs' claims should still be precluded under the Settlement Agreement
because such agreement contains a provision stating that the agreement shall remain in force
despite the subsequent discovery of additional facts not known at the time the agreement was
executed.
In response to Plaintiffs' claim that Defendant employed fraud or undue influence to
procure the allegedly fraudulent letters written after August 10, 2001, Defendant contends that,
whether or not such letters are fraudulent, Plaintiffs' claims should still be dismissed because they
effectively waived any and all such claims by executing the Settlement Agreement. Specifically,
Defendant argues that Plaintiffs' attempt to invalidate the Settlement Agreement based on the
"fraudulent" letter fails because 1) the Settlement agreement expressly accounts for the possible
existence of unknown facts; 2) the Settlement Agreement permits Clyde to distribute the Trust
property, by any method, to any person of his choosing; 3) Defendant never used a material
misrepresentation to induce Plaintiff to execute the Settlement Agreement; and 4) Plaintiffs'
argument that the Settlement Agreement is invalidated by the existence of the 2001 letters is
foreclosed by the parole evidence rule.
Furthermore, Defendant contends that Plaintiffs' claims raise issues that are not ripe for
adjudication because such claims would be contingent on future events that might not occur.
Ripeness is a jurisdictional requirement in that a court, once it has ascertained that the issues
presented are not ripe for adjudication, can go no further and must dismiss the litigation. Similarly,
4

Defendant argues Plaintiffs' allegations that Defendant "plans" or "intends" to engage in a
particular form of conduct provide no basis for relief because there is no legally cognizable premise
to provide a remedy for inchoate offenses in civil cases. Defendant cites to the Utah Supreme
Court's stance on this issue: "When it is ascertained that there is no jurisdiction in the court
because of the absence of a justiciable controversy, then the court can go no further, and its
immediate duty is to dismiss the action." Salt Lake County v. Bangerter, 928 P.2d 384, 386 (Utah
1996).
Defendant contends that Plaintiff, Scott A. Lunceford, is not the successor trustee of the
Clyde Trust because Clyde executed two amendments to the Trust. The first amendment
appointed Defendant as trustee and the second amendment appointed Dayle Jeffs ("Jeffs") as
trustee. Significantly, Defendant asserts that the second amendment did not invalidate the first
amendment except to appoint Jeffs as trustee. Defendant therefore argues that the Trust appoints
Jeffs as trustee and Defendant as successor trustee, leaving out the Plaintiff.
Finally, Defendant argues that she is entitled to her costs and attorneys fees in this litigation
because Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim on which relief can be granted.
B.

PLAINTIFFS' ARGUMENTS

Plaintiffs, on the other hand, argue Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is not appropriate in this
instance because Plaintiffs did not release their potential future interests in the Trust when they
executed the Settlement Agreement. Plaintiffs contend the language of the Settlement Agreement
clearly does not regard the Trust as having been amended by the allegedly fraudulent letters
created after August 10, 2001.
Plaintiffs further argue the fact that the Settlement Agreement and the Trust neither make
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an additional disposition of the local residence nor the remainder interest in the Coronado,
California condominium, demonstrates that the Settlement Agreement did not release Plaintiffs'
future interests in the Trust property. Therefore, Plaintiff, Scott A. Lunceford, claims he is now a
remainder beneficiary of the Trust property. Additionally, Plaintiff, Scott A. Lunceford, argues
that he did not release any future unvested interest in the Trust property because he had no legal
"claim" to that unvested interest at the time the Settlement Agreement was executed.
Moreover, Plaintiffs contend that, on the face of the Settlement Agreement, the parties did
not agree to release claims to the validity of the 2001 letters' supposed amendment to the Trust.
Plaintiffs also argue that Defendant's fraudulent procurement of the 2001 letters may void the
Settlement Agreement because a covenant of immunity will not protect a person against his own
fraudulent actions. Plaintiffs assert that the claims at issue in the case at bar were never made prior
to execution of the Settlement Agreement and therefore, the claims currently at issue all arise after
the Settlement Agreement and were thus not released under the terms of the Settlement
Agreement.
Finally, Plaintiff, Scott A. Lunceford, contends that he, and not the Defendant, is the validly
appointed successor trustee, arguing that the Trust's second amendment effectively does away
with the Trust's first amendment by reinstating the Trust as it was originally at the time of creation
of the Trust. Plaintiff, Scott A. Lunceford, claims that under the terms of the original Trust
agreement Plaintiff, rather than Defendant, was appointed to assume the role of successor trustee.
In sum, Plaintiffs contend that a Motion to Dismiss their claims is not appropriate because a valid
case or controversy does exist in that Plaintiff, Scott A. Lunceford, claims a remainder interest in
the Trust and such a claim manifestly conflids with Defendant's assertion of her right to act as
6

trustee and invade the principal of the Trust in any way she sees fit.
C.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

,f

[T]he following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion: . . . failure

to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Rule 12(b)(6), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
When applying this rule, the Utah Supreme Court has indicated that a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss is proper if it clearly appears that a plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his or
her claims. Coleman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990).
D.

AN EXAMINATION OF PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT AND ARGUMENTS MAKES IT CLEAR THAT
THE PLAINTIFFS CANNOT PROVE A SET OF FACTS IN SUPPORT OF HIS CLAIMS

The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that "[settlements are favored in the law, and
should be encouraged, because of the obvious benefits accruing not only to the parties, but also to
the judicial system." Ostler v. Buhler. 957 P.2d 205, 206 (Utah 1998) (quoting Tracv-Collins
Bank & Trust Co. v. Travelstead, 592 P.2d 605, 607 (Utah 1979)). Following this public policy,
an accepted stipulated settlement agreement constitutes a binding and enforceable contract
between the parties. Brighton Corp. v. Ward, 31 P.3d 594, 599 (Utah App. 2001). Such a written
agreement is rebuttably presumed to be an integrated agreement on its face of the terms and
conditions it purports to cover. See Smith v. Osguthorpe, 58 P.3d 854, 857 (Utah App. 2002),
Similarly, ,f[a]n agreement is integrated where the parties thereto adopt a writing or writings as the
final and complete expression of the agreement." Eie v. St. Benedict's Hosp.. 638 P.2d 1190
(Utah 1981).
The parties in this case clearly intended to make the Settlement Agreement "the final and
complete expression of the agreement." The following sections from the Settlement Agreement
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distinctly bear this complete and final integration out:
For and [in] consideration of the execution of this Agreement and
the covenants, promises and performances of this Agreement, and
except for the obligations of this Agreement, the parties hereto, and
each of them . . . do hereby release and forever acquit and
discharge each other . . . from any and all liability, rights, claims,
commissions or other compensation, demands, obligations,
damages, losses, injuries, costs, expenses, attorney fees, all actions,
causes of action, controversies of any nature of any kind or
description whatsoever, existing or arising out of, related to or
based upon the parties' dealings with one another from the
beginning of time to the date of execution of this Agreement,
including, but not limited to, all known damages, losses, actions,
and causes of action arising out of or related to the Claims, and all
asserted and threatened claims, and any related claims described in
the Recitals herein above, the same which are herein incorporated
by reference and made and acknowledged as material terms of this
Agreement. ^[9 (emphasis added).
It is expressly agreed and understood that to the extent stated
above, the Agreement releases losses, injuries, damages, and claims
of every kind and character the parties or may have against each
and all other persons or entities from the beginning of time to the
date of execution of this Agreement, for whose conduct they may
be liable arising from or related to the claims and offenses stated in
the Recitals above, and arising from or related to the Claims. The
parties also acknowledge that they may hereafter discover facts
which occurred from the beginning of time to the date of execution
of this Agreement, which are different from, or in addition to, those
which they no know to be true, or matters which underlay the
Claims or the potential claims of the parties' alleged injuries, losses
or damages, and agree that this Agreement and the release
contained herein be and remain effective in all respects
notwithstanding such different or additional facts or the discovery
thereof. The parties expressly waive the benefit of any statute or
rule of law, if any, which might otherwise limit the scope of this
Agreement because of unknown matter existing from the beginning
of time to the date of execution of this Agreement, whether
material or otherwise. ^10 (emphasis added).
This agreement shall not, in any manner, restrict, impair, or limit
Clyde's right or ability to distribute any of his property by lifetime
8

transfer, will or other testamentary disposition or in any other
manner, to any person or persons of his choosing.... This
Agreement shall not serve to limit or modify Mona's rights under
the Prenuptial Agreement with respect to the separate property of
Clyde Lunceford as constituted after execution and performance of
this Agreement. ^[5 (emphasis added).
Mona waives and surrenders any rights she may have, in law or
equity, to assert claims against... [any] business entity of the
Lunceford family. \6 (emphasis added).
This Agreement sets forth the entire agreement and understanding
between and among the parties hereto with respect to the subject
matter hereof and supersedes all prior written and oral agreements,
term sheets, negotiations and understandings; [it] shall be binding
upon [all parties], and may not be rescinded, canceled, terminated,
supplemented, amended, or modified in any manner whatsoever
without the prior written consent of all parties. ^[18 (emphasis
added).
IV.
CONCLUSION AND RULING

This Court rules that the Settlement Agreement was meant to settle all claims between the
parties, including those involving facts and circumstances not yet discovered or realized. Under
these circumstances, Plaintiffs cannot prove a set of facts in support of their claims to invalidate
the Settlement Agreement. Consequently, this Court grants Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.
Defendant is entitled to an award of attorney's fees as may be established by affidavit. Counsel for
Defendant is instructed to prepare an Order consistent with the Court's findings. The Order needs
to articulate that Defendant's counterclaim remains viable and is unaffected by the Order of
Dismissal.
Dated this 1st day of July 2004.

/
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Dated this

NAME
BENSON L JR HATHAWAY
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PO BOX 45120
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84145-0120
JEFFREY WESTON SHIELDS
ATTORNEY PLA
ONE UTAH CENTER STE 600
201 S MAIN
SALT LAKE CITY UT
84111-2215
DAYLE JEFFS
ATTY
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day
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BENSON L HATHAWAY, JR. (Bar No. 4219)
THOMAS A. MECHAM (Bar No. 6612)
KARINA F. LANDWARD (Bar No. 9438)
KIRTON & McCONKIE
1800 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
P.O. Box 45120
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0120
Telephone. (801) 328-3600
Attorneys for Defendant Mona Vincent Lunceford
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SCOTT A. LUNCEFORD, and DEBORAH
LUNCEFORD HARKER,
Plaintiffs,

ORDER ON DEFENDANT MONA
VINCENT LUNCEFORD'S MOTION TO
DISMISS PLAINTIFFS' PETITION AND
COMPLAINT

v.
MONA VINCENT LUNCEFORD, an
individual; and M. DAYLE JEFFS, in his
capacity as Trustee of the Clyde M. Lunceford
Trust,
Defendants.
MONA VINCENT LUNCEFORD,
Counterclaimant,
v.
SCOTT A. LUNCEFORD, and DEBORAH
LUNCEFORD HARKER,
Counterclaim defendant.

Case No. 030404549
Judge Lynn W. Davis

Defendant Mona Lunceford's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Petition and Complaint came
before the above-entitled Court for hearing on Tuesday, June 22, 2004, at 4:00 p.m. Petitioners
were represented by counsel Jeffrey W. Shields and Andrew H. Stone, Defendant Mona Vincent
Lunceford was represented by counsel Benson L. Hathaway, Jr. and Thomas A. Mecham. The
Court having reviewed the pleadings and papers on file, having heard the arguments of counsel,
being fully advised in the premises took the matter under advisement and issued a Ruling on
Defendant Mona Vincent Lunceford's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Petition and Complaint
dated July 1, 2004. For the reasons set forth in its July 1, 2004 Ruling, and for good cause
appearing, the Court hereby
ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES as follows:
1.

Defendant Mona Vincent Lunceford's Motion to Dismiss is granted.

2.

Plaintiffs' Petition and Complaint is dismissed against the Defendant Mona

Vincent Lunceford with prejudice.
3.

Defendant Mona Vincent Lunceford's counterclaim remains viable and is hereby

expressly ordered unaffected by this Order of Dismissal.
4.

The "Lis Pendens -recorded by Plaintiffs pursuant to their Complaint is horoby

released.
5.

Defendant Mona Vincent Lunceford is entitled to an award of her attorneys' fees

and costs as may hereafter be established by affidavit.
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DATED this / /

day of Jiity, 2004
BY THE COURT

By:

Fourth Di:
Approved as to form:

JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH

By:
Jeffrey W. Shields
Andrew H. Stone
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this I^O day of July, 2004,1 caused to be served a true
copy of the foregoing ORDER ON DEFENDANT MONA VINCENT LUNCEFORD'S
MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS' PETITION AND COMPLAINT, by the method
indicated below, to the following:
Jeffrey W. Shields

JONES WALDO HOLBROOK &
McDONNOUGH
170 South Main, #1500
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Counterclaim
Defendants
M. Dayle Jeffs
JEFFS & JEFFS PC
90 North 100 East
P.O. Box 888
Provo, UT 84603
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( KLS. Mail, Postage Prepaid
^fHand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
^fHand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
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Jeffrey W. Shields (USB #2948)
Andrew H. Stone (USB #4921)
Ryan M. Harris (USB #8192)
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH
170 South Main Street, Suite 1500
Salt Late City, Utah S4101
Telephone: (801) 521-3200
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Counterclaim Defendants
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

SCOTT A. LUNCEFORD and DEBORAH
LUNCEFORD HARKER,
AFFIDAVIT OF ML DAYLE JEFFS
Plaintiffs,
Case No. 030404549
vs.
Judge Lynn W . Davis
MONA VINCENT LUNCEFORD, an
individual; and M. DAYLE JEFFS, in his
capacity as Trustee of the Clyde M. Lunceford
Trust,
Defendants.
MONA VINCENT LUNCEFORD,
Counterclaimant,
vs.
SCOTT A. LUNCEFORD and DEBORAH
LUNCEFORD HARKER.
Counterclaim Defendants.
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STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF UTAH

)
: ss.
)

M. Dayle Jeffs, having beenfirstduly sworn upon oaih, deposes and states as follows:
1

I am an individual over 18 years of age, and I make the following affidavit baaed on my own

personal knowledge, and would so testify if called upon to do so.
2.

I am an attorney with the Provo, Utah law firm of Jcfis & Jeffs, P.C., and have been a

member in good standing with the Utah State Bar since 1957.
3.

For many years, I performed legal services for Clyde Lunceford ("Clyde") in a variety of

matters.
4.

I understand that, in 1999, Provo attorney Steve Skabelund helped Clyde set up a trust known

as the Clyde M Lunceford Trust Hhe Trust*'). Sometime later, in or around 2001,1 became aware that
Clyde had, in or around July 2000, executed documents restating the Trust in its entirety. As far as 1 know,
both the 1999 original Trust doouments as well as the 2000 documents restating the Trust installed Clyde
as the Trustee of the Trust.
5.

The assets of the Trust were (1) a parcel of property in Utah County, Utah, and (2) a

condominium unit in Coronado, California ('ithe California Condominium"). After the 2000 restatement,
the beneficiaries of the Trust were Clyde's wife Mona Vincent Lunceford f 4Mona") and Clyde's children
from a previous marriage Scott A. Lunceford ("Scott'*) and Deborah Lunceford Harker ("Debbie77).
6.

As set forth in the Trust documents after the 2000 restatement, Mona was to be conveyed a

life estate in the California Condominium by the Trustee after the death of Clyde, and Scott and Debbie were
to receive equal shares of all remaining assets of the Trust.

7.

Clyde, of course, as Trustee, had therightto amend the Trust at any time. Indeed, in June

20011 had a meeting with Clyde where he discussed with mc certain problems he had been having with his
children and he confided in me that he had been seriously considering amending his Trust to give the
residual estate to his grandchildren rather than to Scott and Debbie. However, Clyde did not ask me to assist
him in making any such amendment, and, to my knowledge, Clyde did not act to amend the Trust at that
time.
8.

In August 2001, I had another meeting with Clyde where he again told me that he was

considering leaving the residual estate in the Utah County property and the California Condominium to his
grandchildren rather than to Scott and Debbie. He told mc during this meeting that he still hadn't decided
whether to effect this amendment or not. He told me thai he would decide later whether to so amend the
Trust,
9.

On August 20,2001, Clyde did amend the Trust, but did not change the beneficiaries. The

sole amendment effected on August 20, 2001 was to install me as the new Trustee of the Trust, replacing
Clyde, From that point forward, until October 2003, T served as Trustee of the Trust.
10.

During the latter part of 2001, Clyde told mc more about the many disputes he had with his

children and some ofthe family business entities. Some of the disputes became quite heated, and Clyde was
considering whether to sue Scott and Scott's wife Becky. The main dispute was about a limited liability
company that had been created to hold Lunceford family assets—Clyde felt like he did not have sufficient
control over the assets, which had originally been contributed by Clyde to the LLC, and the children
contended that Clyde's capital account in the LLC was overdrawn. There were several other ancillary
disputes, including one concerning the California Condominium.
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During the latter part of 2001, Clyde and some of the other members of the family entered

into negotiations to attempt to resolve these intra-family disputes before theyripenedinto litigation. The
product of those negotiations was a Settlement Agreement and Mutual Release (*the Settlement
Agreement**), which was executed effective January 22,2002. In my capacity as Trustee and on behalf of
Clyde, I was actively involved in these negotiations. I drafted the initial Settlement Agreement that was
signed in 2001 > which was thereafter signed by other persons besides Clyde and Scott in the more formal
Settlement Agreement dated January 22,2002.
12.

My understanding of Paragraph 4 of the January 2002 Settlement Agreement was that Scott*

Debbie, and their spouses were affirming that they did not have any claim that they were, at that time,
entitled to present use and/or fee simple title to the California Condominium. At the. time, there were
documents that purportedly placed the California Condominium in Scott's name, and part of the Settlement
Agreement was that Scott would convey any interest pursuant to that holding of tide to the Trust, not that
Scott would be precludedfromhaving his father give him an interest in the California Condominium if he
desired to do so. Indeed, my understanding was that Paragraph 4 did not have anything to do with the Trust;
1 did not understand that either Scott or Debbie was giving up anyrightsthey might have under the Trust,
and 1 did not understand that Clyde intended to, or did. amend the Trust in any way through Paragraph 4 or
any other provision of the Settlement Agreement,
13.

Indeed I thought Paragraph 5 made clear to^^

release of iheir claim related to the documents that purportedly placed the California Condominium in
Scott'sname. Paragraphs states that nothing in the Settlement Agreement shall impair Clyde's future rights
to amend his will, the Trust, or any other testamentary instrument I understood, and still understand, this
language to mean that the Settlement Agreement does not in any way impair Clyde's right to leave the
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California Condominium, upon his death, to whomever he might select (including Scoti and/or Debbie),
through his will, through the Trust, or through other testamentary means, At that time, Clyde and I
specifically discussed that if the property was placed back in the Trust. Clyde could do witjfcii as he later
decided without any restriction, including leaving an interest to Scott and Debbie,
14.

I am certain that Clyde shared this understanding of the Settlement Agreement Indeed, in

February 2002* only weeks after the execution of the Settlement Agreement, Clyde came to my office to
meet with me. During that meeting, we continued the conversation we had bean having in various meetings
about his testamentary intentions for the California Condominium, and I asked him if he had decided
whether to make his grandchildren (rather than Scott and Debbie) the beneficiaries of his Trust. He told me
that he still hadn't decided whether to amend the Trust to remove Scott and Debbie as beneficiaries and
substitute the grandchildren.
15.

During all of these conversations in 2001 and 2002 about whether to substitute the

grandchildren for the children as Trust beneficiaries, there was never any discussion about amending the
Trust to leave Mona additional assets of the Trust (other than the life estate which she would receive upon
Clydds death under the Trust language as written).
16.

During the spring and summer of 2002, Clyde suffered a series of health problems, and was

eventually moved to East Lake Care Center in Provo so that he could get full-time medical and other care.
In July 2002,1 met with Clyde at East Lake, and was disheartened by Clyde's deteriorating condition. Clyde
could not really cany on a coherent conversation, and could not adequately respond ro inquiries about
whether to sell the California Condominium, After this July meeting, I concluded that Clyde appeared to
lack capacity to address issues related to the TrusL

17.

In October 2002, Mona called me by telephone. She told me that she needed to have some

changes made so that she would be able to manage his affairs given Clyde's deteriorating condition. Then
she had Clyde get on the phone. When he got on the phone, he told me he wanted a power of aitomey for
Mona and 1 asked him what that was for, and he said "So she can sign the checks." I informed him thai it
was my understanding that Mona was already a signatory on the bank account and was paying all ofhis bills.
He then called to Mona in a loud voice. "Mona what am I supposed to tell Dayle?" I could hear Mona tell
Clyde to tell me that she, Mona, needed to be Trustee. Clyde then told me that he wanted Mona to be the
Trustee. Since I was of the opinion that Clyde lacked capacity to make those kinds of decisions about the
Trust, I declined to act on Mona's instructions. I was also of the opinion that if Mona were named as Trustee
there would be ongoing conflicts between her and Scott and Debbie, who were the residual beneficiaries of
the condominium.
18.

In November 2002,1 had a meeting with Mona to discuss several issues related to Clyde's

affairs. Mona again told me that she needed to be made Trustee ofthe Trust, and she told me that Clyde had
expressed to her that he wanted Mona to have the California Condominium and the Utah County property
(in-other words, all of the Trust assets). At that meeting, 1 asked her how he was doing and she said
u

Sometimes he seems to be rational and other times not rational." This conversation reinforced my belief

that Clyde lacked capacity to make changes in the Trust.
19.

On December 20,2002.1 learned that Mona had hired the law firm of Kirton & McConkie

to represent her interests related to her claim that Clyde had intended that Mona have all of the Trust assets.
Over the nextfewweeks and months, I spoke on the telephone with and corresponded with Mona's attorneys
in this regard-
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20.

During this period of time, Mona reported to me that Clyde's condition was worsening, and

he was requiring an increasing amount of money to pay for his care. In my capacity as Trustee, I concluded
that it had become necessary for me to sell the Utah County parcel in order to generate funds to maintain
Clyde in his deterioraled health condition- On January 17>2003,1 sent a letter to Mr. Jeff Shiglds, attorney
for Scott, and informed him of this development, and stated that I was informing him of this in view of the
fact that he was "attorney for Scott and Debbie, the residuary beneficiaries under the Trust so that they might
be informed of the necessity of the sale/' This comported with my understanding that Scott and Debbie
remained the residual beneficiaries under the Trust, and that the Settlement Agreement had not altered this
fact in any way. After Mr. Shields informed me that he did not, ai that time, represent Debbie, I sent Debbie
a separate letter, dated January 30, 2003, informing her "as a residual beneficiary of the [T)rust'T of my
intention to sell the Utah County property.
21.

In late February 2003, Clyde passed away.

22.

On or about March 4,2003,1 received a letter from Mona's attorneys. The letter had three

attachments, all dated 2001 ("the three 2001 documents"). I had no recollection of ever having seen orhcard
of-any of them before. Each of them was a writing, purportedly from Clyde, indicating that he intended
Mona to receive the Trust assets in full. However, the documents aroused my suspicions for several reasons.
First, and most significantly, I had had numerous conversations with Clyde, during 2001 and 2O02, regarding
his desires for the Trust assets, and in each of these conversations Clyde had been fully aware of, and in
apparent agreement with, Scott and Debbie being residual beneficiaries under the Trust, and, while he had
agonized for some time about whether to amend the Trust to install his grandchildren (in place of his
children) as residual beneficiaries, he had never once mentioned to me any desire to leave these assets to
Mona, Second, the documents themselves appeared suspicious—one was written in handwriting that was
653455V1
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not Clyde's, but was purportedly signed by Clyde; one was not signed by Clyde at all; and the third was
apparently part of an improper document in which Clyde and Mona had unsuccessfidly attempted to transfer
the California Condominium out of the Trust without Scott's knowledge.
23.

On March 10,2003,1 sent a letter to MonaTs attorneys expressing some of these sentiments,

and making clear to Mona's counsel that my understanding of Clyde's intent was that Ac California
Condominium was to remain in the Trust and that Clyde never once mentioned to me that he inrended for
Mona to have the California Condominium. A true and conect copy ofmy March 1Q„2003 letter is attached
hereto as Exhibit 1.
24.

On March 20, 2003,1 had a telephone conversation with Mr. Thomas Mccham, one of

Mona's attorneys. In that conversation, Mr. Mecham reiterated Mona's position that she was entitled to the
Trust assets in full. Mr Mccham suggested that, in view of the conflict regarding the Trust assets, that 1
should resign as Trustee Mr. Mccham appeared to be assuming that Mona would replace me as Trustee of
the Trust, and that Mona would, as Trustee, take the position that the three 2001 documents had amended
the Trust in her fevor.
25.

After Mr. Mechanic suggestion, I began to consider resigning as Trustee. I was reluctant to

do*so because I recognized the possibility that Mona might, if she became successor Trustee, have a conflict
of interest and not act in an impartial manner.
26.

On May 16,2003,1 sent a letter to Mr. Shields (attorney for Scott and Debbie) in an effort

to explain to him my view of the situation. 1 told Mr, Shields that, despite Monads claims and despite the
Settlement Agreement. I still viewed Scon and Debbie as residual beneficiaries to whom "the condo is to
be distributed^ following Mona's death. I also informed Mr. Shields of the existence of the three 2001
documents, andtoldMr. Shields something of my suspicionregardingthe authenticity of those documents

given my numerous contemporaneous conversations with Clyde during which tk[h]e never gave specific
directions to me to amend the Trust to accomplish what Mana now says was his intern." I noted that, given
the increasingly heated nature of the dispute between Mona and the children, litigation may become
necessary, and that litigation involving the Trust in which the Trust assets are eaten away by irrigation fees
would not be in anyone's best interest, I told Mr. Shields that I was contemplating resigning asTrustce and
solicited Mr. Shields's and his clients' input on the issue, A true and correct copy of my May 16,2003 letter
is attached hereto as Exhibit 2.
27.

On October 2,2003,1 wrote to both Mona1s counsel as well as to Mr. Shields that "I would

be willing to resign [as Trustee] if I am given a release by all beneficiaries" against any claims of
malfeasance as Trustee. Thenextday, on October 3,2003,1 had atclcphone conversation with Mr. Median*
(Mojia's attorney) in which he urged me to resign because, in his view, staying on as Trustee would expose
me to further liabi lily, I took this as a thinly- veiled threat that if I did not resign as Trustee I would be sued
for malfeasance as Trustee, Mr, Meeham then told me that, if I did resign, Mona would be willing to sign
an agreement releasing past claims of malfeasance.
28.

On October 9, 2003f after Mona gave me an indemnity agreement, I agreed to resign as

Trustee. That same day, Mr. Shields senT me a letter expressing his view that my resignation was
inappropriate and may itself subject me to liability.
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29.

On October 13,2003,1 officially resigned as Trustee.

30.

I understand that litigation was commenced shortly thereafter.
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DATED this/^L d»y of *^.4(>04.

M. Dayle Jeffs
SUBSCRIBED AND^WORN TO before me this Jff_ day of jjjMgJ-
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Residing at-
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My Commission Expires:
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
Scott A. Lunceford, and Deborah Lunceford
Harker,
RULING ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO
RECONSIDER

Plaintiffs,
vs.
Mona Vincent Lunceford, an individual; and M.
Dayle Jeffs, in his capacity as Trustee of the
Clyde M. Lunceford Trust,
Defendants.

Civil No. 030404549
Judge Lynn W. Davis

Mona Vincent Lunceford,
Counterclaimant,
vs.
Plaintiff Scott A. Lunceford, and Deborah
Lunceford Harker,
Counterclaim defendants.

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs Scott A. Lunceford's and Deborah
Lunceford Harker's Motion to Reconsider the Court's Ruling on granting Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiffs' Petition and Complaint. The Court having carefully considered the Motions
and Memoranda, now makes the following ruling.

1

RULING
This Court denies the Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider its prior Ruling granting
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Petition and Complaint because 1) the Court did afford
the Plaintiffs the benefit of the Rule 12(b)(6) presumptions and 2) the Court did not improperly
treat the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss as a Motion for Summary Judgment. As it stated in the
prior Ruling, this Court finds that the Settlement Agreement was meant to settle all claims
between the parties, including those involving facts and circumstances not yet discovered or
realized. Under these circumstances, Plaintiffs cannot prove a set of facts in support of their
claims to invalidate the Settlement Agreement, which is plain on its face. Consequently, this
Court denies Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider. Defendant is entitled to an award of attorney's
fees as may be established by affidavit. Counsel for Defendant is instructed to prepare an Order
consistent with the Court's Ruling. As before, the Order needs to articulate that Defendant's
counterclaim remains viable and is unaffected by the Order of Dismissal.

2

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this J^\ day of September, 2004,1 mailed a true and accurate
coy of the foregoing RULING ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO RECONSIDER first class,
postage prepaid, to the following parties:
Benson L. Hathaway, Jr.
Thomas Mecham
Karina Landward
KIRTON & MCCONKIE
1800 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
P.O. Box 45120
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0120
Jeffrey W. Shields

JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & McDONNOUGH
170 South Main, #1500
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
M. Dayle Jeffs
JEFFS & JEFFS PC
90 North 100 East
P.O. Box 888
Provo, UT 84603
CLERK
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,-ourth Judical District Court
of Utah County. State ot Utah
/ p f f f i / # / -[^Deputy
BENSON L. HATHAWAY, JR. (Bar No. 4219)
THOMAS A. MECHAM (Bar No. 6612)
KARINA F. LANDWARD (Bar No. 9438)
KIRTON & McCONKIE
1800 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
P.O. Box 45120
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0120
Telephone: (801) 328-3600
Attorneys for Defendant Mona Vincent Lunceford
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SCOTT A. LUNCEFORD, and DEBORAH
LUNCEFORD HARKER,

ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO
RECONSIDER

Plaintiffs,
v.
Case No. 030404549
MONA VINCENT LUNCEFORD, an
individual; and M. DAYLE JEFFS, in his
capacity as Trustee of the Clyde M. Lunceford
Trust,
!

Judge Derek P. Pullan

Defendants.
MONA VINCENT LUNCEFORD,
Counterclaimant,
v.
SCOTT A. LUNCEFORD, and DEBORAH
LUNCEFORD HARKER,
Counterclaim defendant.

431

On August 24, 2004, Plaintiffs, by and through their counsel of record, filed a Motion to
Reconsider the Court's order dated August 11, 2004, dismissing Plaintiffs' Complaint with
prejudice, pursuant to Defendant Mona V. Lunceford's Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
Motion to Dismiss. On September 13, 2004, Defendant Mona Lunceford by and through her
counsel of record, served a Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider, in
response to which Plaintiffs, on September 20, 2004, served a reply memorandum. The Court
now having read and carefully considered Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider its August 11, 2004
Order dismissing Plaintiffs' Complaint, took the matter under advisement and issued a ruling
dated September 21, 2004. Based on that ruling and for the reasons more fully set forth therein,
the Court now hereby
ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES as follows:
1.

The January 22, 2002 Settlement Agreement between the parties to this litigation

was meant to settle all claims between the parties, including those involving facts and
circumstances not yet discovered or realized;
2.

Plaintiffs therefore cannot prove a set of facts in support of their claims to

invalidate the Settlement Agreement, which is plain on its face;
3.

Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider the Courts' August 11, 2004 order dismissing

Plaintiffs' Complaint with prejudice is therefore denied;
4.

Defendant's counterclaim remains viable and is unaffected by this Order and the

Court's August 11,2004 Order dismissing Plaintiffs' Complaint with prejudice; and,
5.

Defendant Mona Lunceford is entitled to an award of attorneys' fees as may be

established by affidavit.
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DATED this / ?

day of September, 2004.
BY THE COURT

By:
I-fonorable ft
Fourth District
Approved as to form:
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH

LDS
r Plaintiffs
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ^( li^day of September, 2004,1 caused to be served
a true copy of the foregoing ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO RECONSIDER, by
the method indicated below, to the following:
Jeffrey W. Shields

JONES WALDO HOLBROOK &
McDONNOUGH
170 South Main, #1500
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Counterclaim
Defendants
M. Dayle Jeffs
JEFFS & JEFFS PC
90 North 100 East
P.O. Box 888
Provo, UT 84603

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
(Pf Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

(^tj.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

\X _
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FILED
Fourth '.„l!CialDist^ Court
;
-»? !>::• county, Stew
iah
BENSON L. HATHAWAY, JR. (Bar No. 4219)
THOMAS A. MECHAM (Bar No. 6612)
KARINA F. LANDWARD (Bar No. 9438)
KIRTON & McCONKIE
1800 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
P.O. Box 45120
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0120
Telephone: (801) 328-3600
Attorneys for Defendant Mona Vincent Lunceford

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SCOTT A. LUNCEFORD, and DEBORAH
LUNCEFORD HARKER,
Plaintiffs,
v.
MONA VINCENT LUNCEFORD, an
individual; and M. DAYLE JEFFS, in his
capacity as Trustee of the Clyde M. Lunceford
Trust,
Defendants.

MONA VINCENT LUNCEFORD,
Counterclaimant,
v.
SCOTT A. LUNCEFORD, and DEBORAH
LUNCEFORD HARKER,
Counterclaim defendant.

RULING AND ORDER DISMISSING
DEFENDANT MONA LUNCEFORD'S
COUNTERCLAIM, AWARDING
ATTORNEYS' FEES AND DENYING
MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT

Case No. 030404549
Judge Derek P. Pullan

Defendant Mona Vincent Lunceford's Motions to Dismiss her Counterclaim and to Strike
the Affidavit of M. Dayle Jeffs, and her Application for an Award of Attorneys' Fees and Costs
came on for hearing before the above-entitled Court at 1:30 p.m. on Tuesday, November 23,
2004. Plaintiffs were represented by counsel Jeffrey W. Shields and Ryan E. Harris, Esq., and
Defendant Mona Vincent Lunceford was represented by her counsel, Benson L. Hathaway, Jr.
The Court, having reviewed the pleadings and papers on file, having heard the arguments of
counsel, being fully advised in the premises, and for good cause appearing, now enters the
following:
RULING
1.

Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim.
Defendant Mona Vincent Lunceford's Motion to Dismiss her Counterclaim is made

pursuant to Utah R.Civ. P. 41(a)(2) which requires dismissal either by stipulation of the parties
or leave of the Court provided that the Court finds good cause for granting the motion.
Defendant Mona Vincent Lunceford's Counterclaim sought damages for breach of contract
based on Plaintiffs' conduct in bringing this action and a companion action in the state of
California, and in filing corresponding lis pendens. The damages sought by the Counterclaim
were primarily attorneys' fees. The Court finds good cause for dismissal of Defendant Mona
Vincent Lunceford's Counterclaim in this matter as Plaintiffs do not oppose the Motion, and this
Court's August 11, 2004 Order per Judge Davis resolved all claims between the parties, and
therefore all of the issues raised in the Counterclaim, and awarded attorneys' fees and costs to
the Defendant Mona Vincent Lunceford, there is no claim left for this Court to resolve. The
Court therefore grants Defendant Mona Vincent Lunceford's Motion to Dismiss her
Counterclaim. As the parties have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues raised in
2
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the Counterclaim, which issues have been resolved in favor of the Defendant Mona Lunceford,
dismissal of the Counterclaim is with prejudice, provided this Order of Dismissal with Prejudice
does not in any way prejudice Ms. Lunceford's right to enforce the January 21, 2002 Settlement
Agreement in the future based on acts not raised in the Counterclaim.
2.

Attorneys' Fees
Defendant Mona Vincent Lunceford's Application for Attorneys' Fees pursuant to this

Court's August 11, 2004 Order is supported by the Affidavit of Defendant's counsel Benson L.
Hathaway, Jr. and corroborated by the Affidavit of Jesse Trentadue. The Affidavit of Mr.
Hathaway meets all of the requirements of Rule 73 in that it demonstrates the basis for the
award, states reasonably detailed descriptions of the time spent and work performed, including
for each item of work the name, position and hourly rate of the person who performed the work,
and sets forth factors showing the reasonableness of those fees and the amount of attorneys' fees
previously awarded.

The Affidavits of Messrs. Hathaway and Trentadue are unrebutted.

Plaintiff does not challenge the hourly rate or number of hours spent in this action but is instead
critical of attorneys' fees incurred prior to the service of the Summons in this matter, in the
California action, and in the sale of the Utah County property. Resolution of these issues is
governed by the language of the January 21, 2002 Settlement Agreement itself which provides,
"In the event any action or proceeding is brought to enforce the provisions of this Agreement, the
prevailing party is entitled to recover costs and reasonable attorneys' fees whether such sums are
expended with or without suit." This Court interprets this provision to entitle the prevailing
party to recover attorneys' fees incurred to enforce the Settlement Agreement even if suit was
never filed. Consequently, attorneys' fees incurred in preparation to meet, resolve, or to avoid
threatened claims clearly follows the scope of this language. Based on the representation of
3
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Defendant's counsel that there were attorneys' fees incurred before October 10, and after, which
have been excised from the billing record related solely to the administration of the trust, the
Court finds that attorneys' fees incurred after October 10, 2004, as indicated in Affidavit Mr.
Hathaway were reasonably incurred to meet, resolve and respond to threatened claims by
Plaintiffs and an action which was eventually filed and are therefore appropriately awarded
Defendant. Attorneys' fees incurred in relation to the California suit should be addressed by the
California court and are therefore not before this Court. The fees sought by way of counsel's
Affidavit are to be reduced by those fees relating to the action pending in the California court.
As relates to the Orem home, the pending litigation required negotiation between the parties as to
the sale of the home and therefore those costs are directly related to this action and may be
awarded to Defendant Mona Lunceford.
3.

Motion to Strike Affidavit
As to Defendant Mona Vincent Lunceford's Motion to Strike the Affidavit of M. Dayle

Jeffs, since that Affidavit was filed in conjunction with a Motion to Reconsider filed by Plaintiff,
and since Judge Davis has considered the pleadings filed in support of that Motion and has
issued a ruling denying that Motion dated September 21, 2004, reduced to an order dated
October 19, 2004, the Court determines that it would be inappropriate for it to now strike a
pleading filed in support of a motion that has previously been ruled upon by this Court.
Consequently, Defendant's Motion to Strike the Affidavit of M. Dayle Jeffs is denied.
On these bases and for the reasons set forth herein, the Court enters the following:
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that:
1.

Defendant Mona Vincent Lunceford's Counterclaim is dismissed with prejudice;
4
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2.

Defendant Mona Vincent Lunceford is entitled to her attorneys' fees in the

amount of $21,244.00 and costs in the amount of $382.19; and,
3.

Defendant Mona Vincent Lunceford's Motion to Strike the Affidavit of M. Dayle

Jeffs is denied.
DATED this £&

day of December, 2004.
BY THE COT

Approved as to form:

Date: j P / q Z ^ l
Cyan E. Ha
Andrew \
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this j*f
day of December, 2004,1 caused to be served
a true copy of the foregoing RULING AND ORDER DISMISSING DEFENDANT MONA
LUNCEFORD'S COUNTERCLAIM, AWARDING ATTORNEYS' FEES AND
DENYING MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIDAVIT, by the method indicated below, to the
following:
Jeffrey W. Shields
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK &
McDONNOUGH
170 South Main, #1500
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Counterclaim
Defendants

(^fU.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

M. Dayle Jeffs
JEFFS & JEFFS PC
90 North 100 East
P.O. Box 888
Provo, UT 84603

(O-U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile
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